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Abstract  
In the Norwegian health care system equal distribution and access to care regardless of social 
status, gender, ethnicity and area of living has been raised as an important issue. One of the 
key strengths of the Norwegian health care system is the equity objective of equal use for 
equal need. This paper studies the extent to which the principle of “equal access” and “equal 
use for equal need” is maintained in the specialist health care delivery system of Norway. We 
include three types of specialist health care services: hospital inpatient stay, hospital 
outpatient visit and private specialist visit. We investigate inequality in access with 
accessibility indices that combine rich information on the capacity of specialist health care 
and the distance from residence to the hospital and private specialist care. We investigate 
inequity in the use of specialist health care with data from the 2008 Survey of Living 
Conditions linked with data on access to specialist health care (accessibility indices). We find 
inequality of access to specialist health care revealing that the capital Oslo has the best access 
to specialist health care and the residents of northern Norway (Finnmark county) has the 
worst access. Moreover, we find inequities in use of hospital inpatient stay with respect to 
ethnicity and education, in use of hospital outpatient visit with respect to education and 
access to private specialist and in use of private specialist visit with respect to education, 
household income and the access to private specialists. We find that the better access to 
private specialists is, the higher is the probability of visit to a private specialist. Regarding 
hospital outpatient we find that the better access to private specialists is, the lower is the 
probability of a visit to hospital outpatient clinic. This suggests that the use of a hospital 
outpatient visit is a possible substitute for private specialists. We consider this study to be 
helpful in identifying how equitable specialized health care are distributed and in developing 
future health policies.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The pursuit of equity of access to health care is a central objective of many health care 
systems (Goddard and Smith 2001; p. 1149). Several countries state that their aim is a health 
care system that ensures their citizens’ universal and equitable access to good quality health 
care (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). In the Norwegian health care system equal distribution and 
access to care regardless of differences in social status, gender, ethnicity and area of living has 
been raised as an important issue (Heggestad, 2009). Moreover, the Act on Health Enterprises 
stipulates that the main goal is to provide good and equitable specialist health care based on 
need and independent of age, sex, area, economy and ethnic background.  However, various 
studies find that equal access to specialist health care is not fulfilled (Kopperud 2002) and the 
use of specialist health care in Norway is also determined by easy access and not solely by 
need (Iversen and Kopperud, 2002; Iversen and Kopperud, 2005; Nerland and Hagen, 2008).  
 
The aim of the present study falls into two parts. First, we are interested in whether the 
residents living in different municipalities in Norway have equal access to specialized health 
care irrespective of whether they live very close to a hospital/private specialists or whether 
they live in a remote area. Thus, this motivates to explore whether the policy statement of 
equal access in the Norwegian health care system is fulfilled.  Access to specialized health 
care in this study is measured as a distance weighted form of the simple ratio “per head 
specialized health care” for each municipality and incorporates three elements: (i) the 
capacity of specialist health care as measured by effective hospital beds, physician man-labor 
years and contracted private specialists man-labor years, (ii) the distance from the 
municipality to be served to the municipality providing specialist health care, (iii) a discount 
function is introduced to place higher weights on capacity offered nearby and contrary low 
weights to long distanced capacity. Based on these elements we develop accessibility indices 
as a proxy for access.  
 
Second, adapting an explorative approach, we investigate whether the policy statement about 
equity in the form of equal use for equal need (horizontal equity) is achieved in the 
Norwegian specialized health care system. We obtain results for three types of specialized 
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health care: hospital inpatient stay, hospital outpatient visit and private specialized visit. In 
this study horizontal equity exists if use varies according to need as proxied by morbidity 
variables (self assessed health and the suffering of a chronic illness). Contrary, there is 
horizontal inequity if individuals with the same levels of need utilize different amount of 
specialized health care due to factors that ought not to affect use i.e. access to specialized 
health care. The analyses are organized as follows: we use the constructed accessibility 
indices in part 1 as a proxy for access to specialized health care for each municipality. We 
then merge these indices with data from 2008 Survey of Living Conditions by Statistics 
Norway, thereby combining individual data with a measurement of access to specialized 
health care, providing individual data about use, need, and access to specialized care. The 
determinants of horizontal inequity are analyzed using logistic regression.    
 
This thesis is organized as follows. In section 2 the institutional framework of the study is 
presented. Here we introduce the Norwegian health care system: the public and private actors, 
access to specialists health care and finally equity and access regulation. Since the main 
interest of the thesis is equality and equity, section 3 concentrates on the importance of equity 
in health care and view some widely used principles of equity. In section 4, a literature review 
is presented following section 5 describing the aims of the study. In investigating inequality in 
access we develop accessibility indices presented in section 6. Section 7 describes the data 
and the statistical method used in investigating of equity. Section 8 presents the results and, 
finally, section 9 discusses the results and outlines the main conclusions.  
     
2.  Norwegian health care system  
 
In the last few decades the Norwegian health system has been going through several reforms, 
some radical, making use of different approaches in the financing, organizing and provision 
of services (Johnsen, 2006). New models for financing hospitals, the introduction of the 
regular GP system and the state ownership of hospitals are some of the recent reforms. 
Generally, the reforms have been focusing on priorities and patients rights and the 
responsibility of providing health care services. However, the main vision and goals of 
equality has been consistent over time (Johnsen, 2006).               
 
 
 
The Norwegian health care system is organized in three levels. On the national level, the 
overall responsibility for the health care rests on the central government. Their main tasks 
along with Ministry of Health and Care Services are preparation of major reforms, guidelines, 
responsibility for national policy and income of the lower government levels. On the regional 
level, four Regional health authorities were established and given the responsibility for 
providing citizens with specialist health care within their region. Finally, on the local level, 
represented by the municipalities, has responsibility for primary health care. 
 
In 2002 the state took over ownership of hospitals, until then the county council (19 counties) 
was responsible for financing, planning and provision of specialized health care. This reform 
was made up of three strategies (Johnson, 2006). (1) The responsibility was transferred to the 
central government. (2) Even though the ownership is public, the hospitals are organized as 
enterprises meaning that they are separate legal entities and not an integral part of the central 
government. (3) The responsibility of everyday functioning of the enterprises lies apparently 
in the hands of the general manager and the executive board. Even though the state delegates 
the responsibility it persists in controlling the health care services through guidelines, 
instructions, the financing system and so forth.  
 
The passing of responsibility to local authorities and still maintaining the principle of equity 
in health care to public services is challenging for central government. However, it can be 
argued that despite the central government passes on tasks, it still controls the health care 
services through directives, instructions, supervision and auditing (Johnsen, 2006). For 
example, although the responsibility for primary care is delegated to the municipalities (this 
includes GP scheme), the central government is in control of setting all GP’s source of 
incomes (Johnsen, 2006).     
 
State ownership of the hospitals led to the establishments of four regional health authorities 
(RHAs); Northern, Central, Western and South-East Norwegian Regional Health Authority. 
RHAs’ main task is to plan the development and organization of specialized health care 
according to needs of the regional population while the services are provided by the regional 
health authorities’ health enterprises and agreement with private practices. The aim of the 
health enterprise is to provide high quality specialists health care on an equitable basis to 
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patients in need, irrespective of age, sex, place of residence, financial circumstances and 
ethnic background (The Act on Health Enterprises). The enterprises (24 Health enterprises per 
January 2007) are responsible for one or several somatic hospitals each given a catchments 
area to provide high quality health care services according to the need of the population.  
 
The organization of the specialist health care is often referred to as ‘the health enterprise 
model’ because it is based on a purchaser- provider division (Johnsen, 2006); RHA purchases 
health services while health enterprises along with contracted hospitals and private specialists 
provide specialists health care. About 1/3 of all somatic outpatient activity is provided by 
private specialists in 2008.  
 
The Norwegian health care system is predominantly tax financed. Hospitals are financed by a 
mix of block grants and activity based financing. The financing of private specialists consists 
of a fee-for-service from the National Insurance Scheme, out-of-pocket payments and lump 
sum grants from the regional health authorities. The National Insurance Scheme covers all 
persons who either are residents, or working as employees in Norway.  
2.1 Private health Care System  
 
Although the Norwegian health care system is best described as public, regional health 
authorities are allowed to contract with private agencies whether it is hospitals, specialists or 
outpatient clinics making the private sector nearly fully embedded in the public system. Some 
not-for-profit private hospitals, such as the diaconal hospitals, owned by the Norwegian 
church are financed and fully embedded as a piece of the Norwegian health care  
 
Contracted for- profit- hospitals are financed by the National Insurance Scheme through 
activity based financing based on the DRG system and patient fees. The part of activity in 
private hospital that is not contracted with the regional health authority (hence, without a 
referral from a GP) is mainly financed by a total fee paid out of-pocket by patients. In 1990 
the number of profit hospitals was modest 2 and it significantly increased to 28 by 2004. This 
can be explained mainly by the attractiveness and changes of the private hospitals’ external 
environment. Firstly, the change in hospital reimbursement system; activity based financing is 
introduced in 1997 based on DRG points. Secondly, during period 1999-2004 the Ministry of 
 
 
Health had a large increase in authorization of private specialists. Thirdly, the hospital reform 
2002 meant a large scale contracting with private hospitals to reduce waiting times in public 
hospitals (Midtun, 2007). Finally, the introduction of free hospital choice reform in 2002 
aimed to improve the patient’s rights to choose in which hospital to receive elective treatment 
including contracted for- profit private hospitals and thereby granting the population equal 
access to high quality health care. Some of the major contracted hospitals are: Aleris hospital 
and medical center, Hjelp 24 NIMI AS and Volvat medical center.  
 
Besides from private hospitals, private contract specialists make up the other part within the 
private specialized health care sector in Norway and provide different types of services. 
However, private specialists do not provide inpatient stay. Even though this type of 
outsourcing is quite small compared to the overall treatment (Askilden et al., 2007), the 
number of contracted private specialists accounted for 1,170 man-labor years in 2008. 
However, many patients make use of private specialists due to services not included in public 
services, shorter waiting time and no referrals are needed to enter for those patients willing to 
pay all the costs out of pocket.    
 
The operating grant of contracted specialist health care is dependent upon varies factors: the 
need for expensive treatment and assistant personnel, cost of premises and the size of the 
contract measured in man-labor years (20-100% of an estimated man-labor year) (Midtun, 
2007).  In addition, contracted private specialists receive reimbursement from national 
insurance scheme and out of pocket patient payments.  
 
It is common for private specialists to have a part time employment in the public hospitals, 
also referred to as moonlighting. According to Midtun (2007) a longstanding tradition exists 
regarding specialists combining positions in the private and public sector and is in accordance 
with employee regulations. The hospital and its employed physicians are allowed to plan for 
overtime work within the main hospital job since exemption is made regarding regulation of 
forbidding planned overtime. According to the Ministry of Health and care services (2003) 
50% of the private specialists are estimated to have a part time employment at a public 
hospital.  
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2.2 Access to the specialists health care  
 
At a general level, access to health care refers to the ability to secure a specified set of 
services, at a specified level of quality, subject to a specified maximum level of personal 
inconvenience and cost, whilst in possession of a specified level of information (Goddard and 
Smith, 2001). Several factors can have an impact on a patient’s access to health care: 
availability, quality, financial costs, informing patients of the possibilities of treatment, time 
costs, capacity and travel distance. However, measuring access is complicated and can rarely 
be observed directly. In this study we measure access by incorporating two elements: the 
capacity of hospitals and the distance from a municipality to be supplied to the municipality 
offering specialist health care in terms of a discount factor that converts the distance to 
estimated access (Iversen and Kopperud, 2002). Since our focus is accessing specialist health 
care, figure 1 illustrates the different ways a patient can enter the specialized health care 
services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Non – emergency care patients flows, Iversen and Kopperud (2002) with 
modifications.     
 
Patient with 
symptom 
 
GP 
 
Private Specialists  
 
Hospital outpatient  
 
Hospital inpatient  
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the different patient flows in a non- emergency setting. A patient with 
symptoms may choose not to make use of GP. This may be due to ethical consideration, 
preferences or religious beliefs. However, it is most likely that a patient with symptom in 
need for health care will visit a GP. The general practitioner may choose to treat the patients 
by himself or issue a referral to enter specialist health care: hospital inpatient stay, hospital 
outpatient visit or private specialist visit. The patients are then freely to choose where to 
receive treatment (The Directorate of Health, 2009), even though studies show that few 
patients do make use of this opportunity (Vrangbæk et al., 2007).  A patient with symptoms 
may also contact a private specialist directly. Private specialists do not provide inpatient 
services.    
 
Clearly, accessing the specialist health care is determined by the patient himself and the GP. 
In this relationship we assume that the patient have preferences for his own health, income 
and leisure (Iversen and Kopperud, 2002). GP, on the other hand, is assumed to have 
preferences for his patient’s health and his own income (Iversen and Kopperud, 2002). It is 
reasonable to assume that GPs’ working values and individual characteristics i.e. pushy 
patients, may determine the treatment or referral for the patient to receive specialized health 
care. Moreover, studies show that patients of higher socio economic level communicate more 
actively, show more affective expressiveness and is more involved in the treatment decision 
(Willems S. et al., 2005). This may induce to higher referral rates among patients with high 
socio economic position.  
 
A visit to a GP requires very low out of pockets copayment (132 kroner from 2009-01-07). 
Assuming that the patient and the GP both agree for a referral, out-of pocket payment for 
outpatient hospital or private specialists is 295 kroner per 2009-07-01. There is no-out of 
pocket payments for inpatient hospital services. Patients choosing to enter the private 
specialists without a referral have to pay the total cost out-of pocket.  
 
The GP is financed through grants from the municipality according to the number of patient 
on their list, activity based financing based on number of treatments and diagnostics and out-
of-pocket payment by the patients (Brigham, 2009).         
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A general Norwegian health policy guideline is the LEON- principle (Lavest effektive 
omsorgsnivå); meaning that care should be provided at the Lowest Efficient level of care 
(Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2006). Thus, if justifiable, care should be provided at 
primary care. In this respect GPs play a meaningful role; not only do they provide primary 
care but they also issue referrals to elective patients before gaining access to specialist health 
care. Hence, they act as gatekeepers (Tjerbo, 2009). Tjerbo (2009) argues that fear of losing 
patients results in GP’s acting more as ‘advocates’ rather than gatekeepers and an increase in 
‘unnecessary referrals’. In the next section we explore the laws and regulation that govern 
patient’s rights to health care and access to services.  
 
2.3 Equity and access regulation  
 
Although several reforms have taken place in the recent decade in the Norwegian Health care 
system, solidarity and equal access to care regardless of socio - economic status, sex, age and 
area of living has been a central goal of Norwegian health policy (Heggestad, 2009). Some 
recent reforms i.e. the Norwegian Hospital Reform of 2002 also aimed at securing access to 
be distributed more equally (Nerland and Hagen, 2008).  
 
There are several laws and regulations undertaken by the parliament to secure equitable 
access to health care. The Patients’ Rights Act stipulates the rights to be a patient and its goal 
is ‘to give population equal access to high quality health care by granting patients rights in 
their relations with the health service’. The Patients Rights Act also gives the right for patient 
to choose where to receive treatment (The Directorate of Health; 2009) and is an option for 
patients with referral. The free choice of hospitals also includes private hospitals with an 
agreement with the regional health authorities. To help patients and health personnel to make 
sound decisions, an information internet site was launched, www.frittsykehusvalg.no, 
containing information about public and private hospitals, waiting times and quality 
indicators.  
 
After the state took over ownership of the hospitals, the Act on Health Enterprises was 
launched and section 1-1 stipulates that the aim of the health enterprises is to provide high 
quality and equitable specialist health care to patients in need, independent of age, sex, living 
 
 
area, financial and ethnic background (The Act on Health Enterprises, 2002). A white-paper – 
‘National strategy to reduce social inequalities in health’ states that health is not equally 
distributed between social groups and the marked health inequities is due to those who are 
most financially privileged (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2006). It suggests four 
priority areas to cope with social inequities.  Clearly, from the above legislations and white 
paper, one central objective of the Norwegian health care system is equity of access. But why 
is the objective of access and equity in health care so vital?  
3. The importance of access and equity 
in health Care  
 
World Health Organization states that universal coverage requires that everyone within a 
country can access good quality services irrespective of, age, sex, area, economy and ethnic 
background (WHO, 2008). The Norwegian Act on Health Enterprises was launched and 
section 1-1 stipulates that the aim of the health enterprises is to provide high quality and 
equitable specialist health care to patients in need, independent of age, sex, living area, 
financial and ethnic background (The Act on Health Enterprises, 2002). But why is equity in 
health care so important? 
  
A common first response is that health care is of special importance because it is a necessary 
condition for happiness (Daniels and Sabin, 2002). According to Tobin (1970) health care 
services are regarded as fundamentally necessary for the good life. Moreover, Daniels and 
Sabin (2002) argue that the central moral importance of treating disease with effective health 
care services is to protect normal functioning because it contributes to protecting 
opportunities. Hence, health care increases our quality of life and enriches what life has to 
offer. Aristotle termed this concept “flourishing” (Culyer, 2001). A report on the ethical 
implications of differences in the availability of health services states that health care is of 
special importance, among other things, due to its role in relieving suffering, preventing 
premature death, restoring functioning, increasing opportunity and providing information 
(President’s Commission for the study of ethical problems in medicine and biomedical and 
behavioral research, 1983).  
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Since, health is fundamentally necessary to the good life and resources are scarce, the planned 
use of health care is rationed in accordance with a country’s stated equity principle. Several 
equity principles exist and in the next section we present the most widely used. 
 
3.1 Principles of Equity  
 
Before turning on to explore the principles of equity in health care services, let us first 
emphasize the unique meaning of equity and equality. Equity and equality in health care has a 
moral and ethical dimension. Equality is used to describe a distribution that is equal (Pereira, 
1993) i.e. distributing health care services equally among the population. Equity, on the other 
hand, refers to a distribution that is in essence fair or just (Pereira, 1993) i.e. distributing the 
health care services according to need.    
 
The concept of equity is considered to be elusive (Goddard and Smith, 2001) and difficult to 
interpret and operationalize (Birch and Abelson, 1993). One ideal definition is proposed by 
Powell and Exworthy (2003, p. 53): 
 
’Full equality’ would presumably result if all with equal needs, endowed with equal 
propensities to consult and faced with equal access to health care, consulted with 
equal-quality GPs for equal lengths of time and equal contents of consultation. They 
would, if necessary, be referred, after equal waits, to consultants of equal quality who 
treated them equally and achieved equal outcomes’  
 
Powell and Exworthy’s definition of equity is an ambitious ideal and should be a goal worth 
pursuing. Several principles, definitions and policy statements of equity exist and the 
following distinguishes between three alternative principles: ‘equal access to health care, 
‘equal utilization of health care for those in equal need of health care’ and ‘equal/equitable 
health outcomes’. 
 
One of the most popular equity objectives is ‘Equal access to health care for those in equal 
need’ (Powell and Exworthy, 2003) and is considered as a central target of many health care 
systems (Goddard and Smith, 2001).  The principle implies that those with equal needs have 
 
 
equal opportunities to access health care, and similarly those with unequal needs have 
appropriately unequal opportunities to access health care (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). 
However, those in equal needs may choose to not make use of health care due to i.e. 
individual preferences or religious beliefs. These acceptable reasons for use of health care 
should not be interpreted as inequity in health.  
 
Turning to the concept of ‘equal utilization for equal need’ implies that those for equal need 
for health care make equal use of health care (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). This concept 
needs great care when interpreting, because differences in utilization do not necessarily mean 
that the distribution is inequitable. Let us assume two patients are in equal need for health 
care, for utilization to be equal requires that one of the following applies (Mooney et al., 1991 
p. 478): 
 
(a) That consumers all have the same preferences for health care  
(b) That consumers’ preferences in consuming health care are totally irrelevant or are 
deemed to be so;  
(c) That consumers’ who have a higher/lower than average preference for health care face 
negative/positive discrimination in access to health care.      
 
According to Mooney et al. (1991) proposition (a) does not hold, and accepting this equity 
concept implies acceptance of proposition (b) or (c) thereby accepting that health care is a 
merit good; thus, a radical departure from traditional welfare economics. Moreover, this 
principle depends upon more proactive efforts by policy makers and would require 
individual’s choice to consume health care and preferences to be overridden.  
 
Turning on to the last principle ‘equal/equitable health outcomes’, as implied in the 
terminology, emphasis equal health outcomes, for example as measured by mortality or 
morbidity, and focuses on health rather than health care. This concept is highly undesirably 
because it intervenes too much in how people choose to live their lives and is potentially very 
costly.  
 
In the Norwegian health care system and in the Act on Health Enterprise specialist health care 
should be rationed according to ‘equal use for equal need’ (The Norwegian Act on Health 
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Enterprise). According to Johnsen (2006), the health policy regarding the provision of health 
care services is based on need. Iversen and Kopperud (2002) argue that securing ‘equal use 
for equal need’ is the best policy interpretation for Norway. The authors argue that Norway 
ranks high as one of the most sparsely populated countries in Europe (an average of 15 
persons per ), and ‘equal access’ principle would require that all persons will have the 
same distance to specialized health care, which seems to be highly unrealistic. The Norwegian 
population density is very unevenly distributed among the 430 municipalities i.e. 2.1 persons 
per in Loppa municipal to 1192.5 persons per in Oslo.  
 
Since Norwegian health care system is based on ‘equal use for equal need’, we use the 
concepts of horizontal equity to audit whether this objective is accomplished. Various studies 
use this concept to assess whether the equity objective in health care is fulfilled (Morris et al., 
2005, van Doorslaer 2006). Horizontal equity refers to the equal use of health care services 
for those with equal need, while vertical equity refers to the unequal use of health care 
services for those with unequal need. Horizontal inequity will be defined here as individuals 
with the same levels of need utilizing different amount of specialist health care according to 
factors that ought not to affect use. That is, if use varies with non -need variables i.e. 
education, household income, ethnicity and access to health care.         
4. Literature review 
Nerland and Hagen (2008) conducted a study to find out whether the introduction of state 
ownership to hospitals in 2002 has lead to improved accessibility to somatic specialist health 
care. They find that the non-need indicators waiting time, travel distance and primary care 
supply has a significant effect on use of specialist’s health care. Thus, horizontal inequity 
exists. The analysis of panel data demonstrates that effect of distance between an inhabitant’s 
residence municipality and nearest hospital has increased and is negative; indicating that long 
traveling distance to hospitals has not resulted in the same increase in utilization as for those 
living close to a hospital. A patient living in a municipality fifty kilometers away from the 
nearest hospital was estimated in 2001 to have on average 3 percent lower use of specialist 
health care compared to a patient living in a municipality offering specialized health care. For 
patients living in a municipality hundred kilometers away from the nearest hospital the 
estimated number was 6 percent lower use compared to a municipality offering hospital care. 
 
 
In 2005 these numbers have increased to 3.7 and 7.4 percent respectively. According to the 
authors, one explanation is that patients and their GP living within a municipality offering 
hospital services may be better informed and make more use of these services. Moreover, they 
also suggest that patients living far away from a hospital may choose to not make use of 
specialized health care due to marginal need for care.  
 
Iversen and Kopperud (2002) study whether the Norwegian policy of distributing health care 
according to need is accomplished. Using data from the 1998 survey of Living Conditions by 
Statistics Norway and an index for accessibility of health care, they find that self-rated health 
varies significantly with use of public hospitals in the sense that poorer self-assessed health 
makes more use of public hospitals. However, the use of private specialists did not vary 
according to self-rated health. Accessibility indices had significant effects on the utilization of 
the private specialists. They find that access to hospital beds contributes negatively to a 
private specialist visit, while unexpectedly access to hospital physicians contributes positively 
to a private specialist visit. However, they find that the better the access to private specialists 
is, the higher is the probability of a visit to a private specialist when access to hospital 
physicians is disregarded.   
 
Aakvik and Holmås (2006) investigate whether economic conditions and access to primary 
health care have a significant effect on total mortality rates. Access is measured as the number 
of general practitioners per 1000 inhabitants at the municipality level. Panel data are used on 
municipality data from 1986 to 2001 gathered from Statistics Norway and from the 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). They conclude that there is no significant 
relationship between GPs per capita and mortality rates.  
 
According to Goddard and Smith (2001) geographical access has a significant effect on use of 
health care. Rice and Smith (2001) argue that this may due to “supplier induced demand”; 
meaning that individuals might be ‘induced’ to use more health services in areas with 
significantly high provision of health care. Contrary, people living in areas with low provision 
of health care may experience “supplier suppressed demand”.  Goodman et al. (1997) study 
whether distance from the residence to the nearest hospital has an impact on hospitalization 
and mortality. After controlling for age, sex, bed supply, median household income, rural 
residence, academic medical center and presence of nursing home patients , they find that 
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distance to hospital is an important influence on hospitalization. Residents living more than 
30 minutes away from the hospital make less use of hospitalization compared to residents 
living in a zip code with a hospital.   
 
 
Finnvold (2009) in a working paper about equity in the Norwegian health care system makes 
a distinction between “micro studies” and “macro studies”. “Micro studies”are concerned 
about specific treatments or services directed towards a target group i.e. the influence of 
distance on uptake of plastic surgery. These studies are based upon patient’s journals or 
clinical evaluation by a health personal. One main conclusion from these studies is that a 
relationship between need for health care and use or access to health care does not exist and 
that people with low socio economic status make less use of health care services when 
adjusted for need. Turning on to the literature on “macro studies”, these studies are concerned 
about general population surveys; whether the use of health care is based on need (individuals 
self-assessed health). These studies find that effect of socio economic gradient on use of 
health care have changed over time. While previous studies show that patients in high socio-
economic positions use more of health care, latter studies find that patients in low socio-
economic position use more services also when adjusted for need indicators.  
 
Two literature reviews Dixon et al. (2006) and Goddard et al. (1998) find that people in 
higher socio-economic groups are using more specialized health care compared with people in 
lower socio-economic groups when adjusted for need. In explaining the differences, Dixon et 
al. (2006) distinguish between demand and supply factors. Differences in health beliefs, 
communication skills, self-efficacy, knowledge and the cost of travelling to receive care are 
suggested by the authors to explain some of the different pattern of health care utilization.   
 
Our data sets enable us to make a number of contributions to this literature. First, we are 
interested in whether equal access to specialized health care irrespective of place of residence 
is achieved in the Norwegian health policy. Access incorporates three elements: (i) the 
capacity of specialists health care (ii) the distance from residence to the nearest hospital (iii) a 
distance decay effect in that the likelihood of a patient making use of specialists health care 
decreases with increasing travel distance to the nearest hospital. Second, the data are more 
recent covering 2008 data. Finally, there have been a number of developments with possible 
 
 
implication on accessibility: the state ownership of hospitals in  2002 and the following 
establishments of regional health authorities and health enterprises, free hospital choice 
introduced in 2001 and the Act of Patient Rights, the regular GP scheme in 2001 and national 
plans to cope up with social inequalities in health (The White Paper Report no. 16 (2002-
2003) Prescription for a healthier Norway, The White Paper Report (2006-2007) No. 20 
National strategy to reduce social inequalities in health).       
5. Aims of the Study  
The present study falls into two parts. First, we construct accessibility indices as a proxy for 
access to specialized health care. The aim is to find out whether the principle of equal access 
to specialized health care is fulfilled and in accordance with the Norwegian health policy. 
Second, we use the constructed accessibility indices in order to study whether access has as 
impact on use of specialized health care. We include some demand side variables i.e. age, sex, 
socio-economic position, chronic illness and self-assessed health, due to their potential 
confounding effect and because they are strong indicators of need for care i.e. self assessed 
health and chronic illness (Jylha, 2009; Oliver & Mossialos, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Research model.  
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The research question 1: Is the principle of equal access to specialized health care in 
Norwegian health policy achieved? The background for this question is to investigate 
whether the goal of the Norwegian health care system equal access to specialist health care 
services are fulfilled. There are several laws and regulation undertaken by the parliament to 
secure equitable access to health care i.e. the act on health enterprises and the Patients Rights 
Act. However, Kopperud (2002) found that access to specialized health care varies 
significantly between the municipalities, using the 1998 hospital capacity data.  
 
The research question 2: Does access have an impact on use of specialized health care? 
This is a follow up question. Here we are interested in whether access influences the use of 
specialized health care. There is horizontal inequity in the Norwegian specialist’s health care 
system if people in equal need for care are utilizing different amount of specialist health care 
according to factors that ought not to affect use i.e. geographical distance to specialized health 
care.   The constructed accessibility indices in research question 1 are used as proxies for 
access. The specialist health care included is hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient and 
contracted private specialists. Previous studies have shown that geographical access has a 
significant effect on use of health care (Goddard and Smith, 2001; Nerland and Hagen, 2008; 
Goodmaen et al. 2007; Rice and Smith, 2001). Iversen and Kopperud (2002) study whether 
access has an impact on use of specialists health care. They find that access has significant 
effects on the utilization of contracted private specialists. Moreover, they find discrepancy 
between the patient’s health status and the use of private specialists i.e. not rationed according 
to need and conclude that the use of private specialists seem to function as an alternative to 
general practitioner (Iversen and Kopperud, 2002).        
 
Iversen & Kopperud (2002) used data from 1998; in our study we use the 2008 Survey of 
Living Conditions by Statistics Norway. Since then, two major reforms were implemented 
aimed to increase efficiency: a list system for GP’s and the state taking over ownership of 
hospitals in 2002. Carlsen and Norheim (2005) in a study find that the list patient system 
leads to more competition for patients. Since GP financing is mainly based on the number of 
patients, there is an incentive for GPs to act less as gatekeepers for society and more as 
advocates for patients to avoid losing patients (Tjerbo, 2009). Hence, a different pattern on 
use of health care may be observed. Furthermore, preliminary results, following the state 
 
 
taking over ownership, point to some positive outcomes, such as decreased waiting list 
(Johnsen, 2006). This again may result in a different pattern on use of specialist health care.     
6. Accessibility modeling  
In this section we investigate whether the policy goal of equal access to health care is 
accomplished. We construct accessibility indices for the measurement of access to specialist 
health care. The index measures the perceived availability of specialized health care for each 
municipality within the four regional health authorities. The indices incorporate two elements: 
a measure of capacity of specialist health care and their proximity to the population of interest 
including a discount factor that converts the distance to estimated access. The final outcome is 
a number for each municipality reflecting access to specialist health care. 
6.1 Capacity of Specialist Health Care  
In our study the hospital capacity is measured along two- dimensions: effective beds and 
physician man-labor years. These data are provided by Statistics Norway. Effective beds are 
defined as the average available beds during the year. Effective beds are calculated by 
dividing the total amount of day-night beds with number of days a year. In addition to this we 
include the size of the contract with private specialists health care; 20-100% of an estimated 
man-labor year, which is estimated to 37.5 hours weekly work all along at least 44 weeks of 
the year.  
 
Norway is very sparsely populated. The somatic hospitals differ a lot in terms of size and 
function. Each hospital is given a catchment area. The hospital is responsible for providing 
high quality specialist health care to the population within the catchment area. The number of 
patients included in each catchment area varies from 12,020 to about 401,335 inhabitants, 
with an average of 147,000 inhabitants per catchment area. Data on hospital catchment areas 
were collected through information available at their websites.  An overview of all hospitals, 
public and non for profit hospitals with an agreement with RHA, is presented in appendix A, 
along with their catchment area.  
 
The function of the 63 somatic hospitals, including specialists and non commercial hospitals, 
varies a lot according to its complexity. We can group the specialized health care supplied 
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into three: supply at local level (general-/local hospitals), supply at regional level (regional 
hospitals) and supply at national (tertiary care hospital) level. A tertiary care hospital is 
defined as a university hospital with national responsibilities and treatment for patients 
referred from secondary care. These hospitals offer the most complex and technologically 
sophisticated services and because of its complexity i.e. teaching and research, specialty and 
expensive equipment are concentrated in few central facilities.  Regional hospitals offer 
services that require more complex treatment and cannot be provided in a general- or local 
hospitals. A general- or a local hospital has the following minimum package of services:  
surgery division with acute medical treatment, internal medicine division with acute medical 
treatment, maternity ward and necessarily support functions within anesthesia, x-ray and 
laboratory services (Erikstein et al., 2006). Finally, some specialist hospitals exist. These 
hospitals concentrate on offering health care services of a few treatment types. 
 
6.1.1 The Distribution of Hospital Capacity  
 
The state ownership of hospitals from 2001 led to the establishments of five1
 
 health regional 
authorities, each responsible for the public hospitals in its region. Every region has its own 
regional hospital (table 1).   
REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY COUNTIES INCLUDED  REGIONAL HOSPITAL  
Southern and Eastern Norway Østfold, Akershus, Oslo, Oppland og 
Hedmark, Vestfold, Buskerud, Telemark, 
Aust-Agder og Vest-Agder.  
Ullevål University hospital.  
Western Norway  Rogaland, Hordaland og Sogn og fjordane.  Haukeland University hospital.  
Central Norway  Møre- og Romsdal, Sør-Trøndelag og 
Nord-Trøndelag  
St. Olavs University hospital  
Northern Norway  Nordland, Troms and Finnmark  North – Norway University hospital  
Table 1. An overview of Regional Health Authorities, counties included and regional hospital.     
 
The data of hospital effective beds and physician man-labor years are provided by Statistics 
Norway, 2007 data, and are divided by the number of population of interest to result in a ratio 
per head effective beds and man labor years. For most of the general- local hospitals, the 
number effective beds and man-labor years were captured directly from the available data and 
                                                 
1 After the merge between Southern and Eastern health authority in 2007, today there are four health regional 
authorities.  
 
 
divided by the catchment area of interest. For an overview over hospitals and their catchment 
area see Appendix A. However, the issue becomes more complicated for a national 
responsibility hospital (Rikshospitalet University Hospital) and regional hospitals due to its 
construction; providing both national- and regional level treatments to its patients, and at the 
same time providing general- and local hospital treatments. Consequently, we use a 
distribution formula to allocate the activity at national, regional and local level (table 2).  
 
 
   
 
Percentage rate; the 
proportion of beds that is 
assigned to the 
catchment area   
Percentage rate; the 
proportion of beds that is 
assigned to region 
inhabitants   
Percentage rate; the 
proportion of beds that is 
assigned the country  
Haukland Uni. Hos.  35.00 % 65.00 % 0.00 % 
St. Olavs Hospital  35.00 % 65.00 % 0.00 % 
Nord- Norge Tromsø  35.00 % 65.00 % 0.00 % 
Rikshospitalet Uni. Hos.  0.00 % 20.00 % 80.00 % 
Ullevål Univ. Hospital 35.00 % 65.00 % 0.00 % 
    
    
 
Total effective beds 
available for the 
hospitals catchment area     
Total effective beds 
available to the region   
Total effective beds available 
for the country  
Haukland Uni. Hos.  341.25 633.75 0 
St. Olavs Hospital  307.3 570.7 0 
Nord- Norge Tromsø  178.15 330.85 0 
Rikshospitalet Uni. Hos  0 186.2 744.8 
Ullevål Univ. Hospital   270.2 501.8 0 
    
 
Table 2. Example: The distribution of effective beds according to catchment area, region and to all inhabitants in 
the country using percentage estimates. 
 
Haukland University Hospital at Bergen had a total amount of effective beds equal to 975. We 
assign 35 percent of its beds to its local catchment area, while the rest, 65 percent of the beds, 
are allocated within the region. This indicate that approximately 35 percent of its capacity is 
allocated to provide general-/local hospitals high quality specialist health care treatments, 
while the rest is allocated to tertiary care and regional care. This capacity percentage estimates 
is in accordance with capacity distribution presented in NOU 1996:5 (Kopperud, 2002).   
 
The following percentage estimates are used for distributing effective hospital beds and man-
labor years in accordance with the hospital’s catchment area and region inhabitants: the 
activity of Haukland University Hospital, St. Olavs hospital and University Hospital of 
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Northern Norway is distributed 65 percent to the number of inhabitants in the region. The 
Ullevål University Hospital is estimated to direct 65 percent of its capacity to providing 
specialist’s health care to the number of inhabitants in the region and 35 percent to the 
number of inhabitants in the hospital’s local catchment area. Since, Rikshospitalet is the only 
hospital with extensive national responsibilities, 20 percent of its activity are directed to the 
number inhabitants of the region while 80 percent to the number of inhabitants in the country.  
 
There are some other difficulties when considering capacity distribution. Since we are 
interested in the capacity and the availability of specialist health care in each municipality, we 
also need to take account of the various locations of hospital divisions/premises. For example, 
Hospital Østfold is divided into five hospital divisions. In Halden municipality, we have 
hospital Østfold division Halden, in Sarpsborg municipality we find hospital Østfold division 
Sarpsborg, in Fredrikstad municipality we find hospital Østfold division Fredrikstad, in Moss 
municipality we have hospital Østfold avdeling Moss and finally hospital Østfold in Askim. 
Our data include higher level capacity data i.e. Hospital Østfold and not operationalized to the 
five hospital divisions. Therefore we have decided upon a distribution formula to allocate the 
capacity to each of the hospital divisions. We have decided to weight the number of beds and 
man-labor years in accordance with the municipality’s population: 
 
               
 
Where the number of effective beds for each municipality is,  is the number of man-labor 
years and is the number of population in the municipality. 
 
  
    
Municipal  
Number of 
innhibitants 
Percentage of the total number of inhabitants in the 
five municipalities    Number of beds  
    
Askim  14740 7.48 % 37.16971942 
Fredrikstad  72730 36.90 % 183.4025572 
Halden  28400 14.41 % 71.61601299 
Moss  29560 15.00 % 74.54117408 
Sarpsborg  51660 26.21 % 130.2705363 
Totalt  197090 100.00 %  
 
Table 3. Hospital Østfold; distribution of the number of beds at municipal level   
 
 
 
As the table above indicates, Askim municipality will be allocated 7.48 percent of the total of 
beds or 37.16 beds. Fredrikstad, Halden, Moss, Sarpsborg municipalities will be distributed 
183.40, 71.61, 74.54 and 130.27 number of beds respectively.  
 
The same problem occurs with Vestfold hospital. Vestfold hospital has premises located in 
more than one municipality but available to us is the total number of beds and physician man-
years at Vestfold hospital. Hence, we need a distribution formula to allocate a number of 
capacities to the municipalities with premises providing specialist health care. Vestfolds 
hospital has divisions in three municipalities in Vestfold; the hospital in Tønsberg located in 
Tønsberg municipal, the hospital in Larvik located in Larvik municipal and finally the 
hospital in Sandefjord located in Sandefjord municipal.     
 
  
 
Percentage ratio distribution of total 
beds 
Total available beds for each 
division 
Hospital Vestfold division Larvik  25.00 % 106.5 
Hospital Vestfold division Sandefjord  15.00 % 63.9 
Hospital Vestfold division Tønsberg  60.00 % 255.6 
   
Table 4. Vestfold Hospital; distribution of the number beds to the hospital divisions.  
 
Here we did not allocate the hospitals capacity in accordance with the municipalitites 
population since the hospitals located in Sandefjord and Larvik are small and has less activity 
compared to the hospital located in Tønsberg. Table 4 shows the assigned percentage 
estimates used and has been decided upon to reflect the activity level for the hospital 
divisions. The same percentage estimates are used when distributing the number of man-labor 
years to the hospital divisions. Hospital division Larvik, Sandefjord and Tønsberg is 
distributed (106.5), (63.9) and (255.6) beds respectively.  
 
Hospital in Hedmark  is made up of two hospitals located in two municipalities; Elverum and 
Hamar municipal. Our data provide us with the total number of beds and man-labor years at 
Hospital Hedmark, and not allocated to each of the two divisions. The two divisions are 
assumed to be equal in services offered, so we divide the capacity equally between the 
divisions.  
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 Percentage ratio distribution of total beds  Total available beds for each division 
Hospital Hedmark division Elverum   50.00 % 166  
Hospital Hedmark division Hamar  50.00 % 166  
    
Table 5. The distribution of beds to Hospital Innlandet division Elverum and hamar.  
 
In Appendix B the capacity measured by total number of effective beds and man-labor years 
for each hospital is displayed. 
  
In this study we are interested in access to hospitals providing a minimum standard package 
of specialist health care. Therefore, hospitals that do not fulfill this requirement are excluded. 
We have excluded the following hospitals due to a high degree of specialization: Kysthospital 
in Hagevik, Haugesund rheumatism hospital, epilepsy center- SSE, Heart center in Oslo, 
Granheim Lung Hospital, Martina Hansen’s hospital, Rheumatism hospital Lillehammer and 
Betanien hospital. Florø hospital is excluded because it does not offer the required minimum 
standard package of specialist health care.  
 
Turning on to the capacity of contracted private specialists, these data were obtained by 
contacting the respective administration of regional health authorities. The information 
contains the size of the contract (20-100 % of an estimated man-labor years) and the 
municipality where the service is provided. The data at municipality level where then divided 
by the population at the respective region, resulting in a simple ratio “man-labor years per 
head”.  Appendix C shows the contracted man-labor years at municipality level by 
municipality.   
 
 
6.2 Geographical distance to specialists health care   
 
A measurement of accessibility should not only incorporate the capacity of the hospitals but 
also its attractiveness as measured by the physical distance to specialist health care. It is 
reasonable to suggest that individuals with low travel distance to specialist health care are 
 
 
more opt to use specialist health care compared to individual living in rural areas. In this 
section we introduce a deterrence function incorporating high attractiveness to specialist 
health care when the distance is low. Conversely, high distance to specialist health care 
should result in low attractiveness.  
 
A municipality j providing specialist health care at local hospital level is responsible for 
serving all the municipalities i of its catchment area, while the capacity at a regional- or 
national level hospital is directed to all the municipalities i in a region or a country, 
respectively. To take into account that distance reduces the perceived accessibility, we include 
in our model a factor . This factor is a distance weight from a municipality to be served i 
to the municipality where the service is provided j and is simply expressing the effect of 
distance on access. Our first assumption is that the first order derivative to be negative  
 < 0 , and the second order derivate to be positive  > 0 (Iversen and Kopperud, 
2002). The logic of the latter assumption is that an individual is opting to faster modes of 
transportation the longer distance to the ‘target’. Haggett et al. (1977) suggests the following 
deterrence function:  
       
where c is distance and  and  are parameters to be estimated.  
 
The parameters  and  are chosen to maximize a suitable likelihood function. The chosen 
values are  = 0.2 and  = 0. This is in accordance with the assumptions in Carr-Hill et al. 
1994. Giving higher values to will exhibit high absolute value of the elasticity with respect 
to distance, contrary low values will place higher weights on long distances. The chosen 
decay function is then:  
 
    ,  
The first order derivate is the negative:  
 
    ,  
 
The second order with respect to distance is then positive:  
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      > 0 .  
 
From the expressions above, the decay function is expected to decline with distance at an 
increasing rate. Hence, using the distance in time (ranging from 0- 48 hours),  higher weights 
is placed on distance compared to distance in km (ranging from 0 – 2800 km). The example 
below, illustrates the effect of the decay function on measures of distance. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. The effect of distance measure on the decay function.  
 
As indicated by the table 6 above, the distance from a municipality to be served, Ullensvang, 
to the municipality where the service is provided, Odda, Bergen and Oslo, is 0.8 , 3.1 and 6.61 
hours respectively. Or, when calculated in distance 39.7, 131.5 and 357.6 kilometer, 
respectively. When calculating the perceived access using time, the local capacity level (Odda 
hospital) is weighted 0.852,  while using km the same capacity is weighted 0.000356. Thus, 
the distance measure in time, places high weights on capacity compared to distance in km. 
 
Municipality: Ullensvang. Located in western region.  
 
Local hospital: Odda Hospital.  
Regional hospital: Haukeland University hospital  
National hospital: Rikshospitalet University hospital.  
 
 Distance from 
Ullensvang to 
local, regional and 
national hospital 
respectively in 
time,    
 
 
 
 
Distance from 
Ullensvang to 
local, regional and 
national hospital 
respectively in 
km,    
 
 
 
Odda hospital   0.8  0.852144 39.7 0.000356 
Haukleland 
unviersity 
Hospital  
3.1 0.537944 131.5 3.78E-12 
Rikshospitalet 
university hospital  
6.61  0.266246 357.6 8.69E-32 
 
 
 
The distance  between the municipalities i and j is the perceived distance in km and 
journey time by car. InfoMap Norge AS calculated the travel distances between the 430 
municipalities in Norway. To allow accurate drive-time calculation, the calculation was based 
on existing speed limits and possibly boat connections. 
 
 
6.3 Accessibility modeling    
 
In this section we consider the construction of a model for the measurement of the perceived 
accessibility to specialist health care service locations. We assume that the perceived 
accessibility to specialized health care is a function incorporating (i) the capacity of 
specialized health care in each municipality as measured by the number of effective beds, 
physician man-labor years and contracted private specialist man-labor years (ii) the distance 
from a municipality demanding specialist health care to the municipality where the services is 
provided (iii) a distance decay function placing lower weights to long distanced specialized 
health care. The final result is three distance weighted ratios for each municipality “beds per 
head”, “physician man-labor years per head” and “private specialists man-labor years per 
head”.  
 
The perceived accessibility indices  for the residents in municipality i in catchment area k 
in region r can be described as follows (inspired by Carr-Hill et al. 1994):  
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the somatic hospital health services in Norway can be divided into 
three: supply at local level, supply at regional level and supply at national level. A local 
hospital in the catchment area k is providing its capacity   to all the municipalities 
included in the catchment area. This capacity is then divided by the population of the 
catchment area  because we are interested in the relative size of the estimated supply. A 
regional hospital in the region r (r = 1,2,3,4), is serving its capacity to all municipalities 
included in the region (j=1,2,…, ), divided by the population of the region ( ). Finaly, a 
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national hospital is directing its services  to the 430 exicting municipalities in Norway, 
divided by the Norwegian population .  The distance  is calculated for each municipality 
serving specialist health care to the municipalities to be served. The decay function  is 
included so that access is assumed to decline with distance and thereby making long distanced 
specialist health care less attractiveness. c is a constant.  
 
The following example illustrates the use of the accessibility model (table 7) . The 
municipality chosen is Ullensvang and is located in the western region in Norway.   
 
 
 
 
    
           
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Fact data: Ullensvang Municipality.  
 
Before calculating the perceived accessibility for residents in Ullensvang municipality, let us 
first calculate the decay function . In our study we assume that access declines with 
distance. The dictanse from Ullensvang municipality to the local, regional and national 
Municipality: Ullensvang. Located in western region.  
 
Local hospital: Odda Hospital.  
Regional hospital: Haukeland University hospital  
National hospital: Rikshospitalet University hospital.  
 
Capacity of specialists health care measured: Effective beds.  
The number of beds local hospital: 46   
The number of beds regional hospital: 975  
The number of beds national hospital: 931   
 
Distance to local hospital in km: 39.7 km. 
Distance to regional hospital: 131.5 km. 
Distance to national hospital: 357.6 km. 
 
Local hospital catchment area population:  12 410  
Regional population western Norway: 996 870  
Population of Norway: 4 801 055 
 
 
 
hospital is 39.7 km, 131.5 km and 357.6 km respectively. The effective beds available at the 
local hospital Odda are given high weights while lower weights are placed in the capacity of 
the national hospital. Using the decay function  we find: 
  
 
 
Municipality 
Distance to 
local hospital 
in km ,  
 
 
Distance to 
regional 
hospital in 
km,   
 
 
Distance to 
national 
hospital in 
km,   
 
 
Ullensvang       39.7        3.56E-04    131.5  3.78E-12     357.6 8.69E-32 
Table 8. Calculation of weight distances for Ullensvang municipality.  
 
From table 8, the estimated weight on the available beds on the local hospital is 3.56E-04, for 
regional hospital 3.78E-12 and for national hospital 8.69E-32. Thus, the longer distance the 
lower weights on the capacity.  
 
Using the fact table above, we can now calculate the perceived accessibility for the residents 
in Ullensvang municipality, included in Odda hospital’s catchment area in, western Norway 
region as follows: 
 
 
 
=  
= 1,32E-06 
 
The perceived accessibility for the residents in Ullensvang municipality is 1,32E-06. Or, 
1.32E-06 beds for head in Ullensvang municipality weighted for distance.  
 
 
The perceived accessibility number calculated above for municipality Ullensvang does not 
tell us much. In order to make sense of the indices, the calculated accessibility is standardized. 
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The standardized variable is normally distributed with a mean equal to 0, and standard 
deviation equal to 1. The following formula is used to standardize the variables:  
 
Where   is the standardized variabel 
    is calculated accessbility 
  is the mean value of   
  is standard deviation   
 
Hence, if a municipalities standardized variable exceeds 0 (  > 0), this implies that its 
perceived accessibility is higher than the average municipality. Contrary, if municipalities 
calculated standard variable is less than 0 (  < 0) its perceived accessibility to specialized 
health care is less than the average municipality. The interpretation of  is how many 
standard deviation units an observation is above or below the mean and makes it possible to 
compare and rank the perceived accessibility between the municipalities. We are especially 
interested in the municipalities with best and worst perceived accessibility. As the figure 3 
shows, about 95 % of the municipalities accessibility are expected within +/- 1.98 , and 
about 68% of the values are within 1 standard deviation of the mean. The standardization was 
made in SPSS 16.    
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Normal distribution.  
 
6.4 Results  
In this section we view the results of the municipalities’ perceived accessibility as measured 
by effective beds, physician man-labor years and private specialist man-labor years weighted 
both in time and km. It is important to note that the distance measured in time and km differs 
significantly. The distance from southernmost city to the northernmost city in Norway is 
approximately 49 hours using the fastest mode of transportation and in kilometers 
approximately 2 800. This has some implications when calculating accessibility using the 
decay function , and the following parameters  = 0.2 and  = 0. When 
compared to distance measured on time, distance in km places lower weights on capacity at an 
increasing rate, making travel distances in km a cruder measure of accessibility.  
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6.4.1 Hospital Effective Beds   
 
Table 9 below shows the top 10 municipalities with best perceived accessibility in both time 
and km. We start by looking at the distance in time. Compared with average municipality, 
Oslo has the best perceived accessibility and has 9.674 standard deviation better access to 
specialized health care. The reason for the good accessibility in Oslo is the short distance to 
hospitals. Oslo provides its residents’ specialist health care at local, regional and national 
level and with a high per head capacity. The second best perceived accessibility is Odda, 
located in western Norway region. The estimated accessibility in Odda is 3.2 standard 
deviation better access to specialized health care when compared with average municipality. 
Odda hospital is located in the municipality Odda and provides specialists health care to a 
relatively small catchment area, resulting in high number of beds per head. This is also the 
explanation of the high accessibility in the municipality Ullensvang.     
 
 
 
  
Distance in km   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Oslo 9.762199 
Odda 5.062402 
Lillehammer 4.860516 
Skien 4.582924 
Tinn 4.148446 
Drammen 4.04216 
Bergen 3.895528 
Tynset 3.822325 
Lærdal 3.755674 
Voss 3.57091 
 
Table 9. Top 10 municipalities with best perceived accessibility as measured by hospital effective beds.   
 
On the top three, four and five best perceived accessibility, we find Skien, Porsgrunn and 
Siljan municipality respectively, located in eastern Norway, all included in Telemark county. 
The high accessibility at these municipalities is due to the small catchment area for the 
Hospital Telemark division Skien and Hospital Telemark division Kragerø. Thus, resulting in 
high ratio “beds per head”.  The municipalities Lillehammer and Øyer score high on 
Distance in time   
  Municipality Standardized Index  
Oslo 9.67415 
Odda 3.202775 
Skien 3.077522 
Porsgrunn 2.899862 
Siljan 2.84827 
Lillehammer 2.810098 
Øyer 2.487704 
Bamble 2.476048 
Ullensvang 2.411492 
Gausdal 2.282842 
 
 
accessibility because they are included in a catchment area served by Hospital Hedmark 
Lillehammer which provides a high number of available beds. 
 
Turning on to distance measured by km in table 9, comparing the tables reveals some 
differences. Now, included in top ten best perceived accessibilities are the municipalities 
Tinn, Drammen, Bergen, Tynset, Lærdal and Voss. This because distance in km places low 
weight on even small distances and as a result the top ten municipalities with best 
accessibility are municipalities with a hospital facility. The municipality Oslo has 9.762 
standard deviations better access to specialists health care compared to the average 
municipality, followed by the municipalities Odda and Lillehammer.     
 
 
Distance in time   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Berlevåg -2.04357 
Vardø -2.02037 
Hasvik -1.97211 
Lebesby -1.96978 
Båtsfjord -1.9494 
Gamvik -1.94126 
Guovdageaidnu 
Kautokeino -1.76995 
Vadsø -1.76191 
Loppa -1.73824 
Kvænangen -1.69495 
Table 10. The bottom 10 municipalities with worst perceived accessibility as measured by hospital effective 
beds.   
 
The municipalities with the worst access to specialized health care as measured by effective 
beds in our model are (distance in time): Berlevåg (-2.04) , Vardø (-2.02), Hasvik (-1.97) and 
Lebesby (-1.969). One characteristic of these municipalities are their location in Northern 
Norway, and in Finnmark county. Berlevåg has an access to specialized care that is -2.04 
standard deviations lower than the average accessibility in Norway. The reason for this is the 
long travel distance and “beds per head” provided.   
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6.4.2 Physician man-labor years  
The municipality with best perceived accessibility as measured by physician man-labor and 
distance in time, is Oslo followed by Lillehammer, Øyer and Gausdal all these located in 
eastern Norway region (table 11) . Oslo has a perceived accessibility that is 11.77 standard 
deviation units higher than the average accessibility in Norway. Again, this is due to hospital 
capacity in the capital Oslo, providing high capacity services at local, regional and national 
level. Hospital Innlandet division Lillehammer provides specialists health care at local level 
to the municipalities Lillehammer, Øyer and Gausdal. The reason for the high accessibility in 
these municipalities are (1) the high capacity of physician man-labor years and (2) the short 
distance between Øyer and Lillehammer (0.3 hours) and Gausdal to Lillehammer (0.5 hours). 
Compared to the municipality with average accessibility, Drammen (located just outside 
Oslo) has 2.13 standard deviations higher accessibility. 
 
Distance in KM   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Oslo 11.871946 
Lillehammer 5.084567 
Drammen 4.035801 
Bergen 3.984476 
Skien 3.607238 
Haugesund 3.465427 
Tromsø 3.456263 
Bodø 3.291367 
Ålesund 3.282304 
Lørenskog 3.166904 
 
Table 11.  The top 10 municipalities with best perceived accessibility as measured by physician man-labor years.     
 
Turning on to the results weighted in distance km, we still have Oslo as the municipality with 
the best accessibility to specialist health care, followed by Lillehammer, Drammen, Bergen 
and Skien. Oslo has 11.87 standard deviations higher accessibility hospital physician man-
labor years when compared to the average municipality. Furthermore, using the distance km, 
has as indicated, resulted in low weights being placed on capacity on even the smaller 
distances. Thus, municipality where the service is provided experiences the best perceived 
accessibility. In Drammen, Bergen, Skien, Haugesund and Tromsø we find Buskerud 
Distance in time   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Oslo 11.775561 
Lillehammer 2.877092 
Øyer 2.551674 
Gausdal 2.344695 
Drammen 2.139415 
Lier 2.012067 
Ringebu 1.904666 
Nedre Eiker 1.881502 
Røyken 1.832279 
Hamar 1.806286 
 
 
Hospital, Haukeland University Hospital, Telemark Hospital division Skien, Haugesund 
Hospital respectively.  
 
Distance in time   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Berlevåg -2.09173 
Vardø -2.07065 
Lebesby -2.01937 
Båtsfjord -2.00342 
Gamvik -1.99267 
Hasvik -1.9651 
Vadsø -1.82862 
Guovdageaidnu 
Kautokeino -1.79077 
Røst -1.75977 
Loppa -1.68944 
Table 12. The bottom 10 municipalities with worst perceived accessibility as measured by physician man-labor 
years.     
 
Municipalities Berlevåg, Vardø, Lebesby and Båtsfjord are with the lowest perceived 
accessibility. The index is respectively -2.09, -2.07, -2.02, -2.  Again, these municipalities are 
located in the Northern part of Norway, in Finnmark county. Båtsfjord has a perceived 
accessibility to health care that is 2.07 standard deviation lower than the average accessibility. 
The reason for the low accessibility for the residents in Northern Norway is due to the long 
distance to hospital care. Hospital care in Finnmark county is provided by Kirkenes Hospital 
and Hammerfest Hospital. The distances from municipalities Berlevåg, Vardø and Lebesby to 
Kirkenes Hospital are 5.43, 4.98 and 6.85 hours respectively, and to Hammerfest Hospital 
10.02, 10.26 and 7.71 hours respectively.  
 
6.4.3 Private Specialist Health Care  
Turning on to the last accessibility index, capacity of contracted private specialists, the raw 
data where obtained by contacting the administration of the respective regional health 
authorities. The information contains the size of the contract (20-100 % of an estimated man-
labor years) and the municipality where the service is provided (see appendix c). The data at 
municipality level were then divided by the population at the respective region, indicating that 
the contracted private specialists are available for the whole region. Finally, we adjust for 
distance,  resulting in a distance weighted form of the simple ratio “man-labor years per 
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head”. In total there are 774 man-labor years contracted private specialists. As much as 26 
percent of them are located in Oslo.  
   
The municipality with the best perceived accessibility to contracted private health care is Oslo 
as measured by distance both in time and km (Table 13).  This is because South-Eastern 
Regional Health Authority has approx. 200 man-labor years contracts with private specialists 
located in Oslo. Interestingly, when distance is measured in time, the remaining of the ten best 
perceived accessibility municipalities are located in eastern of Norway and 
neighbor/bordering municipalities and with very short distance to make use of the capacity in 
Oslo. Again, however, when using the distance in km, the results become unreasonable 
because now the capacity in Oslo is weighted low even for small distance neighbor 
municipalities. 
 
Distance in KM  
Municipality Standardized Index  
Oslo 13.168939 
Bergen 8.107699 
Trondheim 8.10536 
Tromsø 5.208638 
Bodø 4.920448 
Stavanger 3.324142 
Bærum 3.096208 
Os 2.362468 
Haugesund 2.020955 
Levanger 1.756921 
 
Table 13. Top 10 municipalities with best perceived accessibility as measured by contracted specialists health 
care.  
 
High population density areas such as Bergen, Trondheim and Tromsø rank high on 
accessibility indices. The index is respectively 8.11, 8.10 and 5.2 standard deviations better 
access to private specialists than the average municipality. The municipalities with the worst 
perceived access are Vardø, Sør-Varanger, Berlevåg, Båtsfjord and Vadsø. The accessibility 
index is respectively -1.53, -1.53, -1.53, -1.52, -1.51. The calculated accessibility in Vardø is 
1.53 standard deviations lower than the average municipality.                                 
 
 
Distance in time   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Oslo 2.210394 
Bærum 2.122598 
Asker 2.108632 
Oppegård 2.062795 
Lørenskog 2.048875 
Skedsmo 2.006078 
Nittedal 1.984661 
Lier 1.984128 
Rælingen 1.977956 
Drammen 1.968217 
 
 
Distance in time   
Municipality Standardized Index  
Vardø -1.53817 
Sør-Varanger -1.53491 
Berlevåg -1.53443 
Båtsfjord -1.52499 
Vadsø -1.51431 
Lebesby -1.50265 
Gamvik -1.49975 
Unjárga Nesseby -1.49604 
Deatnu Tana -1.48336 
Bindal -1.45596 
Table 14. The bottom 10 municipalities with worse perceived accessibility as measured by contracted specialists 
health care.  
 
Table 14, shows that municipalities Vardø, Sør-Varanger and Berlevåg has the lowest 
perceived accessibility. Furthermore, all the ten municipalities listed above are located in 
Northern Norway. This is not just due to the long distance to contracted private specialists but 
also due to the low capacity provided. The residence of South- Eastern part of Norway, the 
region with the highest number of contracted private specialist care,  has a capacity 2.55 E-04 
per head, while the residence of Northern Norway has 9.43 E-05 per head.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The aim of this section is to find out whether the residents living in different municipalities in 
Norway have equal access to specialized health care irrespective of whether they live very 
close to a hospital/private specialists or whether they live in a remote area. We construct 
accessibility indices to be used as a proxy for access to specialists health care. The 
accessibility indices incorporate three elements: (i) the capacity of specialists health care as 
measured by effective hospital beds, physician man-labor years and contracted private 
specialists, (ii) the distance from the municipality to be served to the  municipality providing 
specialists health care, (iii) a discount function is introduced to place higher weights on 
capacity offered nearby and contrary low weights to long distanced capacity. The final result 
is three distance weighted ratios for each of the 430 municipalities: “effective hospital beds 
per head” , “physician man-labor years per head” and “private specialists man-labor years 
per head”.   
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Distance from the municipality to be supplied to the municipality providing specialist health 
care is measured both in time and km. The discount function , and the 
parameters used in this study,  = 0.2 and  = 0 are equal to the assumption made by Carr-
Hill et al. (1994). This implies that when compared to distance measured on time, distance in 
km places lower weights on capacity at an increasing rate. Hence, this disparity is presumably 
because travel distance in km, is a cruder measure of accessibility as compared to travel time 
(Nair S et al. 2009).  However, independent of distance measure used, the results indicate that 
the capital Oslo has the best perceived accessibility to specialist health care and the most 
municipalities located in Northern Norway, more specifically Finnmark county has the worst 
perceived accessibility.  
 
Iversen and Kopperud (2002) argues that because Norway is one of the most sparsely 
populated countries in Europe (15 persons per 2km ) ‘equal access’ is hardly attainable since it 
implies that all inhabitants should have the same traveling distance to specialist health care. 
This study supports this conclusion.  
 
It should now be clear that access to specialized health care depends on where you live. Our 
results revealed important variations in access to specialists health care which gives rise to 
ethical concerns. The residence in Oslo has the best perceived accessibility while the lowest 
perceived accessibility is estimated in municipalities in Northern Norway: Berlevåg, Vardø 
and Lebesby. In the next section we take the study a step further and ask whether these 
inequalities in access might have an impact on the use of specialists health care services 
(horizontal inequity).    
 
 
7. Material and Methods  
In this section, adapting an explorative approach, we investigate whether the policy statement 
on equity in the form of equal use for equal need (horizontal equity) is achieved in the 
Norwegian specialized health care system. We include three types of specialized health care: 
hospital inpatient stay, hospital outpatient visit and private specialist visit. In this study 
horizontal equity exists if use varies according to need as proxied by morbidity variables (self 
 
 
assessed health and the suffering of a chronic illness). Contrary, there is horizontal inequity if 
individuals with the same levels of need utilize different amount of specialized health care 
due to factors that ought not to affect use i.e. access to specialized health care. The analyses 
are organized as follows: we use the constructed accessibility indices in part 1 as a proxy for 
access to specialized health care for each municipality. We then merge these indices with data 
from 2008 Survey of Living Conditions by Statistics Norway, thereby combining individual 
data with a measurement of access to specialized health care, providing individual data about 
use, need, and access to specialized care. Identifying the determinants of horizontal inequity is 
analyzed using logistic regression. In case we find that non need variables (education, 
ethnicity, household income and access to specialist health care) vary with use, there is 
horizontal inequity and a discrepancy between public goals and surveyed practice.    
 
7.1 Survey of Living Conditions    
Statistics Norway investigates the living conditions of the Norwegian population including 
health conditions. The 2008 survey of living conditions is a representative data source for the 
population living in private households concerning population’s health. The data are collected 
every three years and is a cross sectional study providing a description of the population’s 
health at a single point of time.  
 
Survey of Living Conditions 2008             Number  Percentage  
Selected for the interview                     10 000 
Not included (dead or  residence abroad)                         316  
Gross selection                                                   9 684 100 
Drop-out                        3 219                          33.2  
Net sample (persons obtained interview with)              6 465     66.8  
Collection method: Telephone- and face- to-face  interview 
Average interview time: 36.2 minutes 
Collection period: 22.September 2008 – 30. Mars 2009 
Table 15. Key figures, the 2008 survey of living conditions. (Wilhelmsen; 2009)  
 
The respondents were selected by stratified multistage sampling and include 10 000 
respondents aged 16 or older. The sample is representative for the Norwegian population in 
private households. A telephone- or a face-to-face interview was obtained from 6 465 persons 
and performed by trained persons from Statistics Norway. The sample consists of 50.9 % 
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women and the average age is 49.8 years. Finally, the drop-out rate was 33.2%. A more 
extensive description of the methods of the survey, including the design and data collection 
can be found elsewhere (Wilhelmsen, 2009).  
 
Data covering self-assessed health, chronic illness, age, gender, ethnicity, education, 
household income, private health insurance and use of specialized health care were all taken 
from 2008 survey of living conditions.  
 
7.2 Measures  
7.2.1 Dependent variables  
 
The outcome variable was use of specialized health care (yes vs. no) and the type of 
specialized health care services is used: “hospital inpatients stay”, “hospital outpatient visit” 
and “private specialist visit”. The data are based on the following self-reported questions: 
   
- Hospital outpatient visit: “Have you during the last 12 months visited a doctor in 
the hospital? It can be outpatient treatment, day surgery or/and day treatment. We 
think of all kinds of contacts. Do not include admission overnight and cases where 
you took a child, spouse or others.”   
- Hospital inpatient stay: “Have you during the last 12 months been a patient 
overnight in a hospital?” 
- Private specialists visit: “Have you during the last 12 months, visited a medical 
specialists outside the hospital? We think of all kinds of contacts. Do not include 
cases where you took a child, spouse or others”.    
The response categories for all these questions were “yes” versus “no” use of health care 
services.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Independent variables  
 
Adapting an explorative approach, we include data on self-assessed health, chronic illness, 
age, gender, ethnicity, education, information about private health insurance and household 
income. Information about self-assessed health is based on asking individuals to evaluate their 
overall self-perceived health on a five-point likert scale: very good, good, fair, bad and very 
bad. Since only 60 out of 6452 respondents chose the “very bad health” category, we 
collapsed the variable into 4 categories for a meaningful interpretation: very good, good, fair 
and very bad/bad health with very bad/bad health as reference. The second health related 
question was about whether the respondents have a chronic illness. The answer was classified 
in yes versus no, with no as reference.     
Individual-level variables  
 
As predisposing variables, we include sex (men versus women) with women as reference. Age 
was divided into four groups due to distribution of data; (i) 16-24, (ii) 25-44, (iii) 45-66 and 
(iv) 67 +, with 67 + age group as reference. Ethnicity was dichotomized as Norwegian versus 
non Norwegian, with non- Norwegian as reference. Household income was dichotomized as 
“Household Income High” (i.e. higher than the mean household income of 639,386 NOK) 
versus “Household Income Low” (≤ 639,386 NOK). “Household Income Low” was used as a 
reference in the analysis. Education was dichotomized as “Education High” (i.e. 
University/college- level education) versus “Education Low” (i.e. high school, middle school 
or no education) with “Education Low” as reference. Finally, there is a dummy variable for 
individuals who have ”private treatment insurance”, an insurance that gives the individual a 
right to examination, hospitalization and other medical treatment within short time.  
 
 
Area-level variables  
Several studies show that geographical access has a significant effect on use of health care 
(Goddard and Smith; 2001, Nerland and Hagen; 2008). As a proxy for access to specialized 
health care we use the constructed accessibility indices for “per head hospital beds”, “per 
head physician man-labor years” and “per head private specialists”. We use the distance 
measures in time because they place more realistic weights on capacity (see chapter 4). All 
these three variables are continuous. In addition, we included a dummy variable equal to one  
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for individuals living within a municipality offering hospital care and zero otherwise and a 
dummy variable equal to one for individuals living within a municipality offering private 
specialist care and zero otherwise . These access variables were merged with individual-level 
variables by Statistics Norway (SSB).  Table 16 shows the variables used in the study.  
 
Variable   Source  Measure  Coding  
Dependent variables  
Hospital inpatient last 12 months  
Hospital outpatient last 12 months  
Private specialists last 12 months  
 
SSB 
SSB 
SSB 
 
Dichotomous  
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
 
0= No, 1= Yes  
0= No, 1= Yes 
0= No, 1= Yes 
Independent variables  
Self-assessed health  
 
Chronic Illness  
Age  
 
Gender  
Ethnicity  
Education 
 
Private health insurance  
Individual living in a municipality 
offering hospital care   
Individual living in a municipality 
offering private specialists care    
Access hospital beds  
Access physician man-labor years 
Access private specialists  
 
 
SSB 
 
SSB 
SSB 
 
SSB 
SSB 
SSB 
 
SSB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorical  
 
Dichotomous  
Categorical  
 
Dichotomous  
Dichotomous  
Dichotomous  
 
Dichotomous  
Dichotomous  
 
Dichotomous  
 
Continuous  
Continuous  
Continuous  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=very good, good, fair  0= very 
bad/bad (REF).  
0= No, 1= Yes  
1=16-24; 25-44; 45-66; 0= 67+ (REF) 
  
1= Male, 0 =Female  
1= Norwegian, 0 = Non Norwegian  
1= Education High, 0= Education Low.  
 
0= No, 1= Yes  
0= No, 1= Yes  
 
0= No, 1= Yes  
 
 
Table 16. Variables used in the study.  
 
 
 
7.3 Statistical Analysis 
The aim of the statistical analysis is to allow us to test models to predict use of specialized 
health care. Since our outcome variables are dichotomous (0 = Non user of specialized health 
care versus 1= User of specialized health care) binary logistic regression is recommended2
 
 to 
estimate the probability of an event (use of health care) occurring. Our logistic model is  
Prob (User of specialized health care) =  
where Z =  and where p is the number of independent 
variables.  
 
Or if written in terms of the log of the odds:  
 
ln       
The interpretation of the coefficients  in a logistic model is the change in the “log odds” as  
changes, not very intuitive. A much more simple and intuitive measure is odds ratio. Using 
simple algebra we find that:  
 
Odds ratio =  =  
 
Exp ( ) is the factor by which the odds ratio changes when the ith independent variable 
increase with one unit holding the other independent variable constant. Alternatively, we can 
express the results in terms of percent change in the odds ratio    
 
Percent change = 100(odds ratio – 1 )   
 
where 1 indicates the amount of unit change in the independent variable. When describing the 
results, Exp , the 95 % confidence interval of the odds ratio and percent change in the 
odds ratio will be used. However, in order to make sence of these statistics an approppriate 
                                                 
2 Logistic regression is recommended over linear regression because it is not possible for a binary variable to be 
normally distributed with a constant variance (heteroscedasticity) and consequently when determining the 
probability of the outcome variable results outside the interval 0-1 may occur (Norusis; 2008). Thus, the problem 
of impossible results is solved when using a loglinear analysis.   
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measurement scale for the independent variables must be used. As mentioned above, as a 
proxy for access to specialized health care we use the constructed accessibility indices for 
“per head hospital beds”, “per head physician man-labor years” and “per head private 
specialists”. However, if we use “per head” as a unit of access rather than access “per 10 000 
residents”, we will be estimating a relative change in odds “per head” change in access to 
specialized health care, which is so small that is hard to make sense out of it. Because of this 
we decided to refit the model using access to “Physician man-labor years per 10 000 
residents” and “private specialists man-labor years per 10 000 residents”. We will get the 
same p – values, but now the odds ratios are much easier to interpret. 
 
We developed four consecutive models. Model 1 includes the need for care variables self-
assessed health and chronic illness only. In model 2 we add the individual covariates age, 
gender, ethnicity, education and household income as non need indicators. Model 3 adds a 
dummy variable for individuals who have ”private treatment insurance” and two area-level 
variables; a dummy variable for individuals living in a municipality offering hospital services 
and a dummy variable for individuals living in a municipality offering private specialist care. 
Finally, in model 4 we exclude the added variables in model 3 and include the accessibility 
indices for physician man-labor years per 10 000 residents and private specialists man-labor 
years per 10 000 residents. The two added variables in model 3 are excluded due to high 
intercorrelations, violating one of the assumptions in logistic regression. We also exclude in 
model 4 the accessibility indices for hospital beds for the same reason; strongly correlated 
with the other accessibility indices.  
 
On condition holding need variables constant, if use varies with non- need variables, 
horizontal inequity exists (the unlike treatment of individuals with the same need). In other 
words, if the coefficients of the non- need variables are statistically significant from 0 
( .  
 
When evaluating the performance of our logistic models, likelihood ratio testing is used to 
test the whether the coefficients excluded from the full model are 0. That is, a null hypothesis 
would be that none of the variables included in the model has an effect. For example, our 
model 2 contains six independent variables (self-assessed health, chronic illness, age, gender, 
ethnicity and education) and the model 1 contains only self-assessed health and age, then we 
 
 
are testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for age, gender ethnicity and education are 
0. This is referred to as ‘model chi-square’ because likelihood ratio testing has a chi – square 
distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the difference between the number of 
independent variables in the two models. The Likelihood ratio is defined as   
 
Likelihood ratio = -2LL(reduced model) – (-2LL(full model))   
 
For practical reasons -2 times the log likelihood (-2LL) is used as a measure of the predictive 
power of the model. A good model is one with small value for -2LL. If the computed change 
in -2 log likelihood is larger than the critical values of the chi – square distribution with k  
degrees of freedom, than the predictive power of all the variables in the full model, after 
adjusting for all the variables in the reduced model is significant. We also use the 
likelihood ratio test to compare model 1 against a model consisting of a constant term only. 
The likelihood ratio test statistics are calculated in the appendix. Since likelihood testing 
requires nested models we do not compare model 3 and 4 against each other. In the appendix 
we also include the McFadden’s likelihood ratio test index . The 
test is interpreted as the proportional reduction in –2LL and increases as the fit improves.     
 
8. Results  
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the logistic regression are presented in table 
17.  Overall, 36.4% reported that they have very good health, 44.3 % state that they have good 
health while 6.0% reported of having very bad or bad health. Furthermore, 40.2 percent 
reported of having chronic illness. Residents living within a municipality offering a hospital 
accounted for 53.2% while 72.7% of the respondents where living within a municipality 
offering private specialists care.  
 
We see from table 17 that during the previous 12 months 10.4 % reported at least one hospital 
inpatient stay, 26.9 % reported at least one hospital outpatient visit and 19.9 % reported at 
least one visit to private specialist health care. Moreover, table 17 indicates that the 
chronically ill and people with very bad and bad health are more opt to use specialist health 
care. It also indicates that overall, females and highly educated report more visits to 
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specialized health care.  Finally, people holding a private insurance seems to make more use 
of hospital inpatient services and residents living within a municipality offering hospital care 
are more opt to use the private specialist health care. In the next section we explore whether 
these differences are significant and still persist after controlling for need for care factor.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 17. Descriptive statistics.  
Variables Total (%) Hospital Inpatient 
(%) 
Hospital Outpatient 
(%) 
Private specialists (%) 
Overall  6465 672 (10.4)  1740 (26.9)  1285 (19.9)  
Predisposing characteristics  
Age  
  16-24  
  25-44 
  45-66  
  67 +  
Gender  
  Male  
  Female   
Ethnicity  
  Non Norwegian  
  Norwegian    
Education  
  Education Low  
  Education High 
Household Income  
  Household Income  Low  
  Household Income  High 
 
 
 
883 (13.7) 
2222 (34.4)  
2396 (37.1)  
953 (14.7)  
 
3172 (49.1) 
3293 (50.9)  
 
454 (7.0) 
5986 (92.6)  
 
4075 (63.0) 
2030 (31.4) 
 
 3374 (52.5) 
3056 (47.5) 
 
 
68 (10.1) 
239 (35.6)  
219 (32.6)  
145 (21.6) 
 
293 (43.6) 
379 (56.4)  
 
37 (5.5)  
631 (94.5) 
 
427 (67.0) 
210 (33.0) 
 
396 (59.1) 
274 (40.9) 
 
 
 
186 (10.7) 
514 (29.6)  
727 (41.8)  
312 (17.9)  
 
752 (43.2)  
988 (56.8)  
 
111 (6.4) 
1622 (93.6)  
 
1106 (66.4)  
559 (33.6) 
 
961 (55.3) 
776 (44.7) 
 
 
110 (8.6) 
415 (32.3)  
520 (40.5)  
240 (18.7)  
 
487 (37.9) 
798 (62.1)  
 
93 (7.3)  
1187 (92.7)  
 
758 (62.0) 
465 (38.0) 
 
668 (52.1) 
613 (47.9) 
 
Need for care factors 
Self-assessed health 
  Very good health 
  Good health  
  Fair health  
  Bad and very bad health  
Chronic illness  
  No  
  Yes  
 
 
2355 (36.4) 
2865 (44.3) 
841 (13.0) 
391 (6.0) 
 
3856 (59.6)  
2597 (40.2)  
 
 
165 (24.6) 
269 (40.1)  
134 (20.0)  
103 (15.4)  
 
286 (42.6)  
386 (57.4) 
 
 
407 (23.4) 
771 (44.3) 
337 (19.4)  
225 (12.9)  
 
730 (42) 
1010 (58)  
 
 
369 (28.7)  
585 (45.5)  
210 (16.3)  
121 (9.4)  
 
618 (48.1) 
666 (51.9) 
Enabling characteristics  
Private health insurance  
  No  
  Yes   
Residents living within a 
municipality offering  hospital 
care  
  No  
  Yes  
Residents living within a 
municipality offering private 
specialists care  
  No  
  Yes  
 
 
5826 (90.1)  
509 (7.9) 
 
 
 
3003 (46.5) 
3440 (53.2) 
 
 
 
1741 (26.9) 
4702 (72.7) 
 
 
609 (91.6) 
56 (8.4)  
 
 
 
326 (48.8) 
342 (51.2)  
 
 
 
194 (29.0) 
474 (71.0)  
 
 
1603 (93.4)  
114(6.6) 
 
 
 
836 (48.2)  
897 (51.8)  
 
 
 
507 (29.3)  
1226 (70.7) 
 
 
1170 (92.3) 
98 (7.7)  
 
 
 
538 (41.9)  
745 (58.1)  
 
 
 
303 (23.6) 
980 (76.4) 
Access indices physician man-
labor years per 10 000 residents  
Access indices private physician 
man labor years  
Mean (Std.) 
19.3370 (15.7) 
 
1.026 (0.498) 
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Model 1: Need for care variables  
 
In model 1 we only include the need for care variables self-assessed health and chronic 
illness. For the use of hospital inpatient stay and hospital outpatient visit the table 18 shows 
that the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is the probability of a hospital inpatient 
stay and hospital outpatient visit. The estimated coefficients are significant at 1 % level. The 
odds ratio for very good health on use of hospital inpatient stay is 0.284, or if inverted it, 
3.5211. This is done to aid interpretation. This tells us that the odds on use of hospital 
inpatient stay are about 3.5211 times greater in the very bad/bad health group than in very 
good health group assuming that all the other factors are hold constant.  
 
For the use of private specialists visit the model shows that both very good health (significant 
at 1%) and good health (significant at 10%) contributes negatively when compared to very 
bad/ bad health. Compared to persons with very bad and bad health, the odds of persons in 
the very good health group making use of private specialists visit decreases by a factor 0.637. 
People reporting fair health is not found to influence the use of private specialists.  
 
People suffering from a chronic illness have a higher probability of a hospital inpatient stay, 
hospital outpatient visit and private specialist visits (significant at 1%). Given the odds ratio 
for chronic illness on hospital outpatient stay, having a chronic illness increased the odds of 
being a user by a factor of 1.975 compared to those with no chronic illness. The confidence 
limit is 1.733 to 2.250, which tells us that even after allowing for sampling error, the 
estimated odds will increase by at least 73% for people suffering from a chronic illness.  
 
The likelihood ratio test in model 1 gives us an overall indication of how well the model 
performs compared to a model with the constant term only. The null hypothesis in a 
likelihood ratio test is that the coeffisients of the new variables included in model 1  are equal 
to 0. From the results above, most of the needs of care variables included in model 1 have an 
influence on use of specialized health care. That is, coefficients differ significantly from 0 
(  . Hence, we most likely will end up rejecting the null hypothesis. The -2 log 
likelihood value in our model 1 on hospital inpatient stay is 3853.56 , the change in -2 log 
likelihood is 149.52 and is significant at 5% (for calculations see appendix). Therefore, we 
 
 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that model 1 is a better predictor of hospital inpatient 
use compared to a model without any variables. The null hypothesis in a likelihood ratio tests 
is also rejected in the case of hospital outpatient visit and private specialists visit (significant 
at 5%). 
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Table 18. The estimated effect of need for care variables on the probability of at least one contact with hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient and private 
specialists health care the previous 12 months.  
Model 1 Hospital inpatient Hospital outpatient Private specialists 
 β  Exp ( β ) 95% CI Exp ( β ) β  Exp ( β ) 95% CI Exp ( β ) β  Exp ( β ) 95% CI Exp ( β ) 
 
Constant  
 
 
 
Perceived health  
Very good health  
Good health  
Fair health  
Bad and very bad health  
 
Chronic illness  
 
-1.455*** 
 
 
 
 
-1.257*** 
-0.998*** 
-0.564*** 
REF 
 
0.452*** 
 
 
 
 
0.233 
 
 
 
 
0.284 
0.369 
0.569 
 
 
1.571 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.208-0.389) 
(0.279-0.487) 
(0.421-0.768) 
 
 
(1.297-1.903) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.322*** 
 
 
 
 
-1.390*** 
-0.948*** 
-0.548*** 
REF 
 
0.680*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.249 
0.388 
0.558 
 
 
1.975 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.194-0.320) 
(0.307-0.489) 
(0.433-0.718) 
 
 
(1.733-2.250) 
 
 
-1.302*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.451*** 
-0.248*  
-0.173  
REF 
 
0.475***  
 
0.272  
 
 
 
 
0.637  
0.780 
0.841 
 
 
1.608 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.486-0.835)  
(0.607-1.003) 
(0.638-1.108) 
 
 
(1.394-1.855) 
 
 
-2 log likelihood  
McFadden 2R  
 
3853.567*** 
0.046953158 
 
6583.913*** 
0.06211825 
 
5906.032*** 
0.01598540 
 
 
Model 2   
 
In model 2 we add the individual covariates age, gender, ethnicity, education and household 
income. We see from table 19, that there is no change from model 1 regarding the effects of 
self assessed health on hospital inpatient. We also find that people with chronic illness more 
opt to use hospital inpatient stay. The odds ratio is 1.553, indicating that having a chronic 
illness increases the odds on use of hospital inpatient stay by a factor 1.533 compared to those 
without any chronic illness (significant at 1%). People in the age group 45- 66 contributes 
negatively to the probability of a hospital inpatient stay compared to the “67 +” age group 
(significant at 1%). The odds on use of hospital inpatient stay are about 1.61 times greater in 
the “67 +” age group than in “45-66” group.  Being a male affects the probability of a 
hospital inpatient stay negatively (significant at 5%), while high education contributes 
positively to a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 10%). Finally, being a Norwegian 
increases the odds of hospital inpatient stay by a factor of 1.774 (significant at 5%).    
 
Regarding hospital outpatient visit, the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is the 
probability of a hospital outpatient visit (significant at 1 %). This shows similar results as 
model 1. The odds of a person making use of hospital outpatient services are 1.938 times 
higher for persons suffering from chronic illness (significant 1%). People in the age 25- 44 
have a lower probability for hospital outpatient visit compared to “67 + “ age group 
(significant 10 %). The odds on use of a hospital outpatient visit are about 1.314 times greater 
for female (significant at 1%). Finally, the odds of a hospital outpatient visit are 1.26 times for 
highly educated people.  
 
In model 2 regarding private specialist visit, fair health still has no influence on the 
probability of a visit to a private specialist. The odds of a person visiting a private specialist 
are 1.543 times higher for person suffering from chronic illness (significant at 1%). The 
younger age group is, the lower is the probability of a private specialists visit. The estimated 
results for the age group 16-24, 25-44, 45-66 are significant at 1 %. Being a male affects the 
probability of a private specialists visit negatively, while the odds on a visit to a private 
specialists for highly educated (significant at 1 %) and people with high household income 
(significant at 5 %) are 1.363 and 1.156 respectively.   
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We tested model 2 for its predictive power using likelihood ratio testing. We test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the term that are excluded from model 2 are 0. That is, the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients for age, gender, ethnicity, education and household 
income are 0. We see from the appendix that the large difference in -2 log likelihood between 
model 1 and 2 is significant at 5 % level. Thus, the use of specialists health care is 
significantly associated with the added variables in model 2. The increase of the McFadden’s 
likelihood ratio index also indicates that model 2 is superior to model 1.   
 
 
 
Model 2 Hospital inpatient Hospital outpatient Private specialists 
 β  Exp ( β ) 95% CI Exp ( β ) β  Exp ( β ) 95% CI Exp ( β ) β  Exp ( β ) 95% CI Exp ( β ) 
 
Constant  
 
Perceived health  
Very good health  
Good health  
Fair health  
Bad and very bad health  
 
Chronic illness  
 
Age : 
         16-24  
         25-44 
         45-66 
         67 +  
 
Male  
 
Norwegian  
 
Education high  
 
Household income high    
 
 
-1.680*** 
 
 
-1.332*** 
-1.034*** 
-0.577*** 
REF 
 
0.440*** 
 
 
-0.258 
-0.079 
-0.477*** 
REF 
 
-0.187** 
 
0.573** 
 
0.178* 
 
-0.052 
 
0.290 
 
 
0.264 
0.356 
0.561 
 
 
1.553 
 
 
0.772 
0.924 
0.621 
 
 
0.830 
 
1.774 
 
1.195 
 
0.950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.191-0.366) 
(0.267-0.473) 
(0.414-0.760) 
 
 
(1.279-1.886) 
 
 
(0.552-1.080) 
(0.720-1.185) 
(0.486-0.792) 
 
 
(0.701-0.983) 
 
(1.112-2.829) 
 
(0.986-1.448) 
 
(0.789-1.143) 
 
-0.233 
 
 
-1.432*** 
-0.966*** 
-0.595*** 
REF 
 
0.662*** 
 
 
-0.094 
-0.167* 
-0.014 
REF 
 
-0.273*** 
 
0.036 
 
0.231*** 
 
0.065 
 
 
 
 
0.792 
 
 
0.239 
0.381 
0.552 
 
 
1.938 
 
 
0.910 
0.846 
0.986 
 
 
0.761 
 
1.037 
 
1.260 
 
1.067 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.184-0.309) 
(0.301-0.482) 
(0.482-0.711) 
 
 
(1.698-2.212) 
 
 
(0.715-1.158) 
(0.700-1.022) 
(0.825-1.179) 
 
 
(0.676-0.858) 
 
(0.790-1.361) 
 
(1.101-1.442) 
 
(0.938-1.214) 
 
-0.781***  
 
 
-0.481*** 
-0.251* 
-0.180 
REF 
 
0.434*** 
 
 
-0.637 ***  
-0.351*** 
-0.243*** 
REF 
 
-0.527 *** 
 
-0.164 
 
0.310*** 
 
0.145**  
 
 
0.458 
 
 
0.618 
0.778 
0.835 
 
 
1.543 
 
 
0.529 
0.704 
0.784 
 
 
0.590 
 
0.848 
 
1.363 
 
1.156 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.468-0.819) 
(0.602-1.006) 
(0.632-1.105) 
 
 
(1.333-1.785) 
 
 
(0.4- 0.698)  
(0.576-0.861) 
(0.648-0.949) 
 
 
(0.518-0.673) 
 
(0.639-1.126) 
 
(1.180-1.573) 
 
(1.004-1.331) 
 
 
 
-2 log likelihood  
McFadden 2R  
 
3815.138*** 
0.046953158 
 
6545.237*** 
0.067627666 
 
 5791.038*** 
 0.03514475 
      
 
Table 19. The estimated effect of need for care variables and individual covariates on the probability of at least one contact with hospital inpatient, hospital 
outpatient and private specialists health care the previous 12 months.
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Model 3  
 
In model 3 we add a dummy variable for persons holding a private insurance, a dummy 
variable for individuals living within a municipality offering hospital care and a dummy 
variable for individuals living within a municipality offering private specialists care. In model 
3, the reference individual has very bad/bad health, female, aged “67 +”, non- Norwegian, 
low educated, household income low, not holding a private insurance, not living within a 
municipality offering hospital care and private specialist care. The results of the logistic 
regression are presented in table 20.     
 
Regarding hospital inpatient stay, the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is the 
probability of a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 1 %). Chronic illness still has a positive 
influence on the probability of a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 1 %). People aged 45-
66 still has lower probability of a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 1 %). Being a male 
affects the probability of a hospital inpatient stay negatively (significant at 1 %), while being 
a Norwegian and highly educated contribute positively to a hospital inpatient stay (significant 
5 %). This shows similar results as model 2. Finally, individuals holding a private insurance 
increase the odds of a hospital inpatient stay by a factor of 1.403 compared to individuals 
with no private insurance (significant at 5%). The two area level variables included have no 
influence on hospital inpatient stay.  
 
With reference to hospital outpatient visit, the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is 
the probability of a hospital outpatient visit (significant at 1 %). People in the age group 25-
44 still have lower probability of a hospital outpatient visit compared with “67 +” age group 
(significant at 1 %). Being male contributes negatively to a hospital outpatient visit 
(significant at 1 %) while people with high education have a higher probability of hospital 
outpatient visit (significant at 1%).  For highly educated people the odds of a hospital 
outpatient visit increase by a factor of 1.289 (or 28.9%) compared to person with low 
education. People living in a municipality offering hospital care and/or private specialists 
care is not found to influence the use of hospital outpatient visit.  
  
Regarding private specialist visit, very good and good health contributes negatively to a 
private specialists visit compared to very bad/bad health; significant at 1 % and 5 % levels 
 
 
respectively. People with fair health is not found to influence the use of private specialist visit 
when compared to people with very bad/bad health. The variable age contributes negatively 
to a private specialist visit. That is, the younger age group is, the lower is the probability of a 
private specialist visit when compared to “67 + “ age group. The estimated results for the 
age group 16-24, 25-44, 45-66 are significant at 1 %. Males have a significantly (1%) lower 
probability of visiting a private specialist. We also find that highly educated individuals and 
people with high household income contribute positively to a private specialist visit; 
significant at 1% and 10% respectively. This is the same results shown in model 2. Finally, 
we find that for residents living within a municipality offering hospital care, the odds of a 
private specialist visit increase by a factor of 1.172 compared to residents not living within a 
municipality offering hospital care, all other factors being equal. Residents living within a 
municipality offering private care and privately insured persons did not influence the use of 
private specialist care.  
 
We tested model 3 for its predictive power using likelihood ratio testing. We test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients for the three added variables in model 3 are 0 and hence not 
associated with use of specialist care. We see from the appendix that regarding private 
specialist visit, the change in -2 log likelihood between model 2 and 3 is significant at 5 % 
level. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis.  However, with reference to hospital inpatient stay 
and hospital outpatient visit we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 5 % significant level. This 
indicates that the partial model (model 2) is superior to the full model of overall model fit. 
The coefficients on the private insurance and area level variables are not statistically at 
standard levels.  
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Model 3 Hospital inpatient Hospital outpatient Private specialists 
 β  Exp ( β
) 
95% CI Exp ( β ) β  Exp (
β ) 
95% CI Exp (
β ) 
β  Exp (
β ) 
95% CI Exp (
β ) 
Constant  
 
Perceived health  
Very good health  
Good health  
Fair health  
Bad and very bad health  
 
Chronic illness  
Age : 
         16-24  
         25-44 
         45-66 
         67 +  
Male  
Norwegian  
Education high  
Household income high 
 
Residents living within a 
municipality offering  
- hospital care  
 
- Private specialist 
care    
 
Private Insurance  
-1.278*** 
 
 
-1.346*** 
-1.047*** 
-0.586*** 
REF 
 
0.432*** 
 
-0.281 
-0.104 
-0.494*** 
REF 
-0.194** 
0.594** 
0.196** 
-0.061  
 
 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.076 
 
 
0.338** 
0.279 
 
 
0.260 
0.351 
0.557 
 
 
1.540 
 
0.755 
0.901 
0.610 
 
0.824 
1.812 
1.216 
0.941 
 
 
 
0.962 
 
0.927 
 
 
1.403 
 
 
 
(0.188-0.361) 
(0.263-0.467) 
(0.410-0.755) 
 
 
(1.266-1.872)  
 
(0.536-1.065) 
(0.701-1.159) 
(0.478-0.780) 
 
(0.695-0.978) 
(1.122-2.925) 
(1.000-1.480) 
(0.780-1.135) 
 
 
 
(0.783-1.182) 
 
(0.739-1.162) 
 
 
(1.032-1.906) 
-0.117 
 
 
-1.423*** 
-0.963*** 
-0.591*** 
REF 
 
0.666*** 
 
-0.091 
-0.165* 
-0.015 
REF 
-0.278*** 
0.016 
0.254*** 
0.067 
 
 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.127 
 
 
0.001 
 
0.890 
 
 
0.241 
0.382 
0.554 
 
 
1.947 
 
0.913 
0.848 
0.985 
 
0.758 
1.016 
1.289 
1.069 
 
 
 
0.966 
 
0.880 
 
 
1.001 
 
 
 
(0.186-0.312) 
(0.302-0.483) 
(0.430-0.714) 
 
 
(1.705-2.224) 
 
(0.717-1.163) 
(0.701-1.025) 
(0.824-1.178) 
 
(0.672-0.854) 
(0.773-1.335) 
(1.124-1.479) 
(0.939-1.217) 
 
 
 
(0.837-1.116) 
 
(0.751-1.032) 
 
 
(0.795-1.261) 
-0.930*** 
 
 
-0.500*** 
-0.262** 
-0.188 
REF 
 
0.432*** 
 
-0.651*** 
-0.367*** 
-0.249*** 
REF 
-0.526*** 
-0.133 
0.276*** 
0.140* 
 
 
 
0.159** 
 
0.076 
 
 
0.161 
 
0.395 
 
 
0.606 
0.770 
0.829 
 
 
1.540 
 
0.522 
0.693 
0.780 
 
0.591 
0.875 
1.318 
1.150 
 
 
 
1.172 
 
1.079 
 
 
1.174 
 
 
 
(0.458-0.802) 
(0.595-0.995) 
(0.626-1.096) 
 
 
(1.331-1.782) 
 
(0.395-0.689) 
(0.566-0.848) 
(0.644-0.944) 
 
(0.518-0.674) 
(0.659-1.163) 
(1.139-1.525) 
(0.999-1.325) 
 
 
 
(1.001-1.371) 
 
(0.902-1.292) 
 
 
(0.922-1.496) 
 
-2 log likelihood  
McFadden 2R  
 
3809.560 
0.04834658 
 
 
6540.344 
0.068324677 
 
5780.292*** 
0.036935169 
Table 20. The estimated effect of need for care variables , individual covariates and area level variables on the probability of at least one contact with hospital 
inpatient, hospital outaptient and private specialists health care the previous 12 months.
 
 
Model 4  
In our last model (model 4) we exclude the three dummy variables added in model 3. Instead, 
we add two continuous variables; accessibility indices for specialized health care as measured 
by “Physician man-labor years per 10 000 residents” and “private specialists man-labor 
years per 10 000 residents”. The results of the logistic regression are shown in table 22.  
 
Regarding hospital inpatient stay, the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is the 
probability of a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 1 %). Chronic illness still has a positive 
influence on the probability of a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 1 %). People aged 45-
66 still have lower probability of a hospital inpatient stay (significant at 1 %). Being a male 
affects the probability of a hospital inpatient stay negatively (significant at 5 %), while being 
a Norwegian and highly educated contribute positively to a hospital inpatient stay 
significantly at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This shows similar results as in model 2 and 
3. Finally, the odds ratio for access to private specialist visit is 0.790. That tells us that for 
every extra “private specialists man labor years per 10 000 residents” provided, the odds of 
hospital inpatient stay decrease by a factor of 0.79 (or 21%), assuming that all other factors 
being equal. Accessibility measured by “physician man-labor years per 10 000 residents” is 
not found to influence the probability of a hospital inpatient stay.  
 
With reference to hospital outpatient visit, the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is 
the probability of a hospital outpatient visit (significant at 1 %). People in the age group 25-
44 still have lower probability of a hospital outpatient visit compared with “67 +” age group 
(significant at 1 %). Being a male contributes negatively to a hospital outpatient visit 
(significant at 1 %) while people with high education have a higher probability of hospital 
outpatient visit (significant at 1%).  For highly educated people the odds of a hospital 
outpatient visit increases by 1.302 (or 30.2%) compared to person with low education. This 
shows similar results as in model 2 and 3. Finally, the variable “private specialists man labor 
years per 10 000 residents” influences the probability for a hospital outpatient visit 
negatively. That is, for every extra “private specialists man labor years per 10 000 residents” 
provided, the odds of hospital outpatient visit decreases by a factor of 0.806 (or 19.4%) 
assuming that all other factors being equal. The added accessibility variable for public 
specialist health is not found to influence the use of hospital outpatient visit.  
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Regarding private specialist visit, people with very good and good health contribute 
negatively to a private specialists visit compared to people with very bad/bad health; 
significant at 1 % and 5 % respectively. People with fair health is not found to influence the 
use of private specialist visit when compared to people with very bad/bad health. The odds of 
a person visiting a private specialist, is 1.510 times higher for someone who suffers from 
chronic illness than for a person who does not suffer from chronic illnesses. The variable age 
contributes negatively to a private specialist visit. That is, the younger age group is, the lower 
is the probability of a private specialists visit compared to “67 + “ age group. The estimated 
results for the age group 16-24, 25-44, 45-66 are significant at 1 %. Males have a 
significantly (1%) lower probability of visiting a private specialists. We also find that high 
educated individuals and people with high household income contributes positively to a 
private specialist visit; significant at 1% and 5% respectively. This is the same results as 
shown in model 2 and 3. Finally, the odds ratio for access to private specialist visit is 1.542. 
That tells us that for every extra “private specialists man labor years per 10 000 residents 
”offered, the odds of private specialist visit increases by a factor of 1.542 (or 54.2 %), 
assuming that all other factors being equal. Accessibility for “physician man-labor years per 
10 000 residents” is not found to influence the probability of a private specialist visit.  
 
We evaluated the performance of the model using likelihood ratio testing. We see from the 
appendix that regarding hospital outpatient and private specialists visit the change in -2 log 
likelihood in model 2 and 4 are significant at 5 % level. Thus, indicating that at least one of 
our accessibility indices is significantly associated with hospital outpatient visit and private 
specialists visit, even after adjusting for model 2 variables (need for care variables and 
individual covariates). The increase of the McFadden’s likelihood ratio index also indicates 
that model 4 is superior to model 2.  However, with reference to hospital inpatient stay, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis at 5 % significant level.  
 
Table 21 shows the overall results of the likelihood ratio testing significant at 5 %. A finding 
of significance, corresponds to the research conclusion that there is adequate fit of the data to 
our model compared to the reference model, indicating that at least one of the added 
predictors is significantly associated to use of specialized health care. Models that are not 
significant will be excluded from the further discussion.  
 
 
 
 Hospital Inpatient 
Visit 
Hospital Outpatient 
Visit 
Private Specialist 
Visit 
Model 1 (ref : model with a 
constant term only) 
Significant Significant Significant 
Model 2 (ref: model 1) Significant Significant Significant 
Model 3 (ref: model 2) Not Significant Not Significant Significant 
Model 4 (ref: model 2)  Not Significant Significant Significant 
Table 21. The overall results of likelihood ratio testing, significant at 5 %.  
 
    
 
 
62 
 
Model 4 Hospital inpatient Hospital outpatient Private specialists 
 β  Exp ( β
) 
95% CI Exp ( β ) β  Exp (
β ) 
95% CI Exp (
β ) 
β  Exp (
β ) 
95% CI Exp (
β ) 
Constant  
 
Perceived health  
Very good health  
Good health  
Fair health  
Bad and very bad health  
 
Chronic illness  
Age : 
         16-24  
         25-44 
         45-66 
         67 +  
Male  
Norwegian  
Education high  
Household income high 
 
Access physician man labor 
years  
 
Access to private specialists 
  
 
-1.468*** 
 
 
-1.317*** 
-1.027*** 
-0.571*** 
REF 
 
0.449*** 
 
-0.265 
-0.084 
-0.480*** 
REF 
-0.188** 
0.531** 
0.194* 
-0.050 
 
0.003 
 
 
-0.236** 
 
 
 
0.230 
 
 
0.268 
0.358 
0.565 
 
 
1.567 
 
0.767 
0.920 
0.619 
 
0.828 
1.701 
1.214 
0.951 
 
1.003 
 
 
0.790 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.193-0.371) 
(0.269-0.476) 
(0.417-0.765) 
 
 
(1.291-1.904) 
 
(0.548-1.074) 
(0.716-1.180) 
(0.485-0.790) 
 
(0.699-0.982) 
(1.064-2.719) 
(1.000-1.474) 
(0.790-1.145) 
 
(0.996-1.009) 
 
 
(0.645-0.967) 
 
 
 
 
0.024 
 
 
-1.413*** 
-0.964*** 
-0.579*** 
REF 
 
0.678*** 
 
-0.115 
-0.179* 
-0.021 
REF 
-0.287*** 
-0.010 
0.264*** 
0.076 
 
0.000 
 
 
-0.216*** 
1.025 
 
 
0.243 
0.382 
0.560 
 
 
1.971 
 
0.891 
0.836 
0.980 
 
0.750 
0.990 
1.302 
1.079 
 
0.999 
 
 
0.806 
 
 
 
 
(0.188-0.315) 
(0.301-0.483) 
(0.435-0.722) 
 
 
(1.727-2.249) 
 
(0.703-1.130) 
(0.692-1.010) 
(0.819-1.171) 
 
(0.666-0.845) 
(0.754-1.300) 
(1.137-1.492) 
(0.949-1.227) 
 
(0.994-1.004) 
 
 
(0.699-0.929) 
-1.358*** 
 
 
-0.530*** 
-0.285** 
-0.196 
REF 
 
0.412*** 
 
-0.644*** 
-0.354*** 
-0.235* 
REF 
-0.532*** 
-0.026 
0.253*** 
0.154** 
 
0.002 
 
 
0.433*** 
 
0.257 
 
 
0.589 
0.752 
0.822 
 
 
1.510 
 
0.525 
0.702 
0.791 
 
0.587 
0.975. 
1.288 
1.166 
 
1.002 
 
 
1.542 
 
 
 
(0.444-0.779) 
(0.581-0.973) 
(0.621-1.088) 
 
 
(1.305-1.746) 
 
(0.399-0.691) 
(0.574-0.858) 
(0.653-0.957) 
 
(0.515-0.670) 
(0.734-1.295) 
(1.114-1.489) 
(1.013-1.342) 
 
(0.998-1.007) 
 
 
(1.318-1.805) 
 
-2 log likelihood  
 
McFadden 2R  
 
3856.544 
 
0.048790709 
 
6613.726*** 
 
0.0700005 
 
 5819.53*** 
 
0.044151765 
Table 22. The estimated effect of need for care variables , individual covariates and access to specialist health care on the probability of at least one contact with 
hospital inpatient, hospital outaptient and private specialists health care the previous 12 month.
 
 
9. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In the Norwegian health care system equal distribution and access to care regardless of social 
status, gender, ethnicity and area of living has been raised as an important issue (Heggestad 
2009). One of the key strengths of the Norwegian health care system is the equity objective of 
equal use for equal need (Johnsen 2006, The Act on Health Enterprises). This motivates to 
audit whether these policy statements in the Norwegian health care system are achieved. The 
aim of the present study falls into two parts. First, we are interested in whether the residents 
living in different municipalities in Norway have equal access to specialized health care 
irrespective of whether they live very close to a hospital and/or private specialists or whether 
they live in a remote area. Second, adapting an explorative approach, we investigate whether 
the policy statement on equity in the form of equal use for equal need (horizontal equity) in 
specialized health care is achieved. Specialized health care included in this study is hospital 
inpatient stay, hospital outpatient visit and private specialist visit. We consider this study to be 
helpful in identifying how fairly and just specialized health care is distributed and in 
developing future health policies.    
 
For this purpose, we first develop accessibility indices for each municipality that incorporate 
both the capacity and the distance to specialized health care to address whether the principle 
of equal access to specialist health care is achieved. According to the results there is not equal 
access in the delivery of specialized health care in the Norwegian health care system. The 
result reveals that capital Oslo has the best access to specialist health care and the residents of 
northern Norway (Finnmark county) have the worst access. This indicates that access to 
specialized health care in Norway depends on where you live.  
 
In part II of our study we take the study a step further and ask whether these inequalities in 
access might induce to the use of more (or less) specialist health care services (horizontal 
inequity). There is horizontal inequity if individuals with the same levels of need utilize 
different amount of specialized health care due to factors that ought not to affect use i.e. 
access to specialized health care. The analyses are organized as follows: we use the 
constructed accessibility indices in part 1 as a proxy for access to specialized health care for 
each municipality. We then link these indices with data on use of specialized health care, self 
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assessed health, chronic illness, gender, age, ethnicity and socio economic position from 2008 
Survey of Living Conditions by Statistics Norway, thereby combining individual data with a 
measurement of access to specialized health care, providing individual data about use, need, 
and access to specialized care. The determinants of horizontal inequity are analyzed using 
logistic regression. 
 
A preliminary conclusion is that the use of hospital inpatient stay and hospital outpatient visit 
are both rationed by need. That is, the worse the self assessed health is, the higher is the 
probability of a hospital inpatient stay and a hospital outpatient visit. Hence, this result is in 
accordance with the stated equity objective. For the use of private specialists the results show 
that people reporting very good health and good health make less use of private specialist 
compared to very bad and bad health. People reporting fair health is not found to influence 
the use of private specialists. Even though, the use of private specialists was not as closely 
related to a person’s self assessed health as in the case hospital inpatient stay and hospital 
outpatient visit this still represents a move in the right direction. Iversen and Kopperud (2002) 
using the 1998 Survey of Living Conditions by Statistics Norway did not find any effect of 
self assessed health on the utilization of private specialists. The effect of our second need 
variable, chronic illness, are both significant and plausible. People suffering from a chronic 
illness are associated with a higher probability of utilization of all three types of specialized 
care. The close association of chronic illness with private specialist visits indicates that 
regular check-ups of people suffering from chronic illness is an important task (Iversen and 
Kopperud, 2002).  
 
For all three types of specialized health care, an individual’s age and gender is associated 
with use of specialists services, after having controlled for self assessed health, chronic illness 
and socio economic variables. Women use more of all types of specialized health care, 
supporting earlier studies (Verbrugge et al., 1987). Several interpretations  have been 
suggested: the differences in reproductive biology, higher rates of morbidity in women than 
men (Verbrugge et al. 1987) and that women are healthier but have worse perceptions of their 
health (Suominen-Taipale et al.; 2006). With respect to age, people aged 45 to 66 had lower 
odds of a hospital inpatient stay than people in the age “67+”. Compared with “67+” age 
groups, people in the age group 25-44 were less likely to have contacted hospital outpatient 
visit. Moreover, we find that the use of a private specialist visit is closely related to a person’s 
 
 
age. We suggest that this effect is due to the people’s perception of good health influenced by 
their age (Iversen and Kopperud 2002).  
 
Our finding that Non-Norwegians were less likely to use hospital inpatient stay than 
Norwegians may indicate horizontal inequity if we believe that this is due to systematic 
discrimination of non Norwegians in use of hospital inpatient visit. We might expect that 
cultural differences may affect use i.e. long delays before contacting health care or denying 
recommended services. Self assessed health may be modified by culture (Jylha; 2009). For 
example, studies find that Italians rate their health more positively than Finns (Jylha et al., 
1998) and the relation between symptoms as pain and self assessed health varies between 
cultures (Gureje, von Korff, Simon and Gater, 1998).  
 
For all three types of specialized health care, individuals with high education were more 
likely to use specialized health care than individuals with low education, after having 
controlled for self assessed health, chronic illness, gender, age and household income. 
According to this result the equity objective, equal use for equal need is not achieved. We 
illustrate this by calculating the predicted probability of a hospital outpatient visit using self 
assessed health and educational level. Figure 4, shows that for all levels of need, high 
educated individuals have a higher probability in use of a hospital outpatient visit than people 
with low education. This may reflect better ability to communicate, obtain and understand 
basic health information (“health literacy”) among highly educated. Individuals with low 
education might lack the ability to express their demand and to know their rights as patients 
causing an under consumption of specialized health care.  
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Figure 4. The mean predicted probability of a hospital outpatient visit by different self assessed health groups 
and by educational level.  
 
We found horizontal inequity in use of private specialist visit favoring patients who are better 
off. Richer people (higher than mean income) are more likely to visit a private specialist than 
a person with low income. This may reflect the easy access to private specialist, since a 
patient does not need a referral to enter but on the other hand, has to pay the full cost of the 
treatment.  
 
An unexpected result is that the residents living within a municipality offering hospital care 
are more likely to visit a private specialist compared to a municipality not providing its 
residents with hospital care. We also find that the high access of living within a municipality 
offering private specialists had no influence on a visit to private specialist. We expected a 
“supplier induced demand”; meaning that individuals might be ‘induced’ to use more health 
services in areas with significantly high provision of health. After checking for high 
 
 
intercorrelations among these two predictors, we found multicollinearity3
 
. When the variable 
living within a municipality offering hospital care is disregarded, we find that for residents 
living within a municipality offering private specialist, the odds for private specialists visit 
increase by a factor of 1.195 (95 % C.I. 1.027-1.389) compared to residents not living within 
a municipality offering private specialists (significant at 5%). To illustrate this, figure 5 
shows the predicted probability of a private specialist visit explained by self assessed health 
and the availability of private specialists. As expected, figure 4 shows that for all levels of 
need, people living in a municipality offering private specialists have a higher probability to 
contact a private specialists than people not living in a municipality offering private 
specialists care.      
 
 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that our models are robust. Meaning that the consecutive inclusion of new variables has 
significant effect on the outcome variables and either the significance or sign of the previously introduced 
variables changed in a substantial way. This represents an ideal situation and indicates low correlation among the 
independent variables. 
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Figure 5. The mean predicted probability of a private specialist visit by different self assessed health groups and 
by access to private specialists.  
 
 
This utilization is an indication of horizontal inequity since two individual’s with the same 
health status should have the same probability of a private specialist visits irrespective of 
whether they live in a municipality offering private specialists or not. This demonstrates that 
the use of private specialist health care in Norway is also determined by easy access than by 
need. This conclusion is in accordance with Iversen and Kopperud (2002) who found that the 
better access to private specialists is, the higher is the probability of a private specialist. One 
possible explanation is that people living in areas with greater supply have lower access costs 
in the form of shorter distances or shorter waiting times due to greater individual net benefit 
(Morris et al., 2005).  
 
The accessibility indices for specialist care have substantial effect on the utilization of private 
specialists and hospital outpatient. We found that the better access to private specialists is, the 
 
 
higher is the probability of a visit to a private specialist. This is just as expected. Regarding 
hospital outpatient we find that the better access to private specialists is, the lower is the 
probability of a visit to hospital outpatient clinic. This suggests that the use of a hospital 
outpatient visit is a possible substitute for private specialists. One possible explanation is that 
better access to private specialists leads to a higher opportunity for GPs to send their patient 
for consultation to private specialists (lower access costs for the patient). Moreover, 
individuals living in areas with high access of private specialists have the opportunity to 
contact a specialist directly with less access cost than an individual living in area with limited 
access to private specialists. This suggests horizontal inequity and represents a challenge for 
health policy makers to bring the publicly funded private specialists in line with the national 
health policy.    
 
There are a number of limitations in our study. First, our utilization measures of use in health 
care are dichotomous (user versus non user) and there is no information on intensity or 
quality of specialized health care provided. Second, the measures of morbidity are based on 
self assessed health while the provision of a referral and access to specialist health care is 
based on the physician assessment of patient’s health (Iversen and Kopperud 2002). Third, 
information obtained from the respondents may be subject to recall bias since use relates to 
the previous last twelve months. Finally, the study does not take into account the possible 
interactions of specialized health care. For example, a patient may have visited a hospital 
outpatient clinic or/and private specialist before a hospital inpatient stay.  
 
These limitations aside, our results provide evidence on inequity in the delivery of specialized 
health care services in Norway. Our findings are evidence for inequity in use of hospital 
inpatient stay by ethnicity and education, in use of hospital outpatient visit by education and 
access to private specialist and in use of private specialist visit by education, household 
income and the access to private specialists. We consider this information to be helpful in 
identifying how fairly and just specialized health care are distributed and in developing future 
health policies.    
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11. Appendix 
Appendix A: An overview of regional health autiority, hospitals and catchment area.   
Regional Health Authority Hospital    Catchment area Municipalities  Residence in the catchment area  
Central Norway       
 
Helse Sunnmøre HF Volda 
Sjukehus  
Giske, Haram, Hareid, Herøy, Norddal, Sande, Skodje, Stordal, Stranda, Sula, 
Sykkylven, Ulstein, Vanylven, Volda, Ørskog, Ørsta and Ålesund. 131 450 
 
Helse Sunnmøre HF 
Ålesund sjukehus  
Giske, Haram, Hareid, Herøy, Norddal, Sande, Skodje, Stordal, Stranda, Sula, 
Sykkylven, Ulstein, Vanylven, Volda, Ørskog, Ørsta and Ålesund. 131 450 
 
Helse Nordmøre and 
Romsdal Kristiansund 
sykehus  
Aukra, Fræna, Midsund, Molde, Nesset, Sandøy, Rauma, Vestnes, Aure, 
Averøy, Eide, Frei, Gjemnes, Halsa, Kristiansund, Rindal, Smøla, Sunndal, 
Surnadal and Tingvoll. 117 130 
 
Helse Nordmøre and 
Romsdal Molde sjukehus  
Aukra, Fræna, Midsund, Molde, Nesset, Sandøy, Rauma, Vestnes, Aure, 
Averøy, Eide, Frei, Gjemnes, Halsa, Kristiansund, Rindal, Smøla, Sunndal, 
Surnadal and Tingvoll. 117 130 
 
St. Olavs sykehus. (Local 
level)  
Sør- Trøndelag county with the exception of  these municipalities: Nordland, 
Osen, Tydal and halve Malvik.  286 860 
 
St. Olavs sykehus (region 
level).    Central Norway region 666 270 
 
St. Olavs sykehus Orkdal 
Sjukehus  
Sør- Trøndelag county with the exception of these municipalities: Nordland, 
Osen, Tydal and half of Malvik.  286 860 
 St. Olavs hospital Røros  
Sør- Trøndelag county with the exception of these municipalities: Nordland, 
Osen, Tydal and half of Malvik.  286 860 
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Helse Nord- Trøndelag 
:Sykehuset Levanger  
Nord- Trøndelag county including Bindal in Nordland og Osen, Selbu, Tydal 
og half of Malvik in Sør- Trøndelag  149 175 
 
Helse Nord- Trøndelag: 
Sykehuset Namsos  
Nord- Trøndelag county including Bindal in Nordland og Osen, Selbu, Tydal 
og half of Malvik in Sør- Trøndelag  149 175 
 
Regional Health Authority Hospital    Catchment area municipalities  Residence in the catchment area  
Northern Norway      
 
Helgelandssykehuset Mo i 
Rana  
Bindal, Sømma, Brønnøy, Vega, Vevelstad, Herøy, Alstadhaug, Leirfjord, 
Vefsn, Grane, Hattfjelldal, Dønna, Nesna, Hemnes, Rana, Lurøy, Træna, 
Rødøy.  76 920 
 
Helgelandssykehuset 
Mosjøen  
Bindal, Sømma, Brønnøy, Vega, Vevelstad, Herøy, Alstadhaug, Leirfjord, 
Vefsn, Grane, Hattfjelldal, Dønna, Nesna, Hemnes, Rana, Lurøy, Træna, 
Rødøy.  76 920 
 
Helgelandssykehuset 
Sandnessjøen  
 Bindal, Sømma, Brønnøy, Vega, Vevelstad, Herøy, Alstadhaug, Leirfjord, 
Vefsn, Grane, Hattfjelldal, Dønna, Nesna, Hemnes, Rana, Lurøy, Træna, 
Rødøy.  76 920 
 
Helse Finnmark Klinikk 
Hammerfest  Finnmark county  72 435 
 
Helse Finnmark Klinikk 
Kirkenes  Finnmark county 72 435 
 Longyearbyen Sykehus  
 Troms county including Narvik, Tysfjord, Lødingen, Tjeldslund, Evenes and 
Ballangen   183 635 
 Nordlanssykehuset Bodø  
Bodø, Meløy, Gildeskål, Beiarn, Saltdal, Fauske, Sørfold, Steigen, Hamarøy, 
Tysfjord- Vest for Tysfjorden, Røst, Værøy, Flakstad, Vestvågøy, Vågan, 
Moskenes, Hadsel, Bø, Øksnes, Sortland and Andøy  132 500 
 
Nordlandssykehuset 
Lofoten  
Bodø, Meløy, Gildeskål, Beiarn, Saltdal, Fauske, Sørfold, Steigen, Hamarøy, 
Tysfjord- Vest for Tysfjorden, Røst, Værøy, Flakstad, Vestvågøy, Vågan, 
Moskenes, Hadsel, Bø, Øksnes, Sortland and Andøy  132 500 
 
Nordlandssykehuset 
Stokmarknes  
Bodø, Meløy, Gildeskål, Beiarn, Saltdal, Fauske, Sørfold, Steigen, Hamarøy, 
Tysfjord- Vest for Tysfjorden, Røst, Værøy, Flakstad, Vestvågøy, Vågan, 
Moskenes, Hadsel, Bø, Øksnes, Sortland and Andøy  132500 
 
Universitetssykehuset Nord- 
Norge Harstad  
Troms county including  Narvik, Tysfjord, Lødingen, Tjeldslund, Evenes and 
Ballangen   183 635 
 
 
 
Universitetssykehuset Nord-
Norge Narvik  
Troms county including  Narvik, Tysfjord, Lødingen, Tjeldslund, Evenes and 
Ballangen   183 635 
 
Universitetssykehuset Nord-
land Tromsø. Local level.  
Troms county including  Narvik, Tysfjord, Lødingen, Tjeldslund, Evenes and 
Ballangen   183 635 
 
Universitetssykehuset Nord- 
Norge Trømsø. Region 
level.  Northern Norway region  463 450  
 
Regional Health Authority Hospital    Catchment area municipalities  Residence in the catchment area  
Western Norway      
  Florø sjukehus  
Not included. The  hospital has focus on tasks of border between primary care 
and specialist health care. The hospials inpatient stay department is closed.   
 Førde sentralsjukehus  
Flora, Gulen, Soulnd, hyllestad, Høyanger, Vik, Årdal, Askvoll, Fjaler, Gaular, 
Jølster, Førde and Naustdal.  106 485 
 
Helse Bergen HF. Local 
level.  
Fedje, Øygarden, Fjell, Sund, Austevoll, Austheim, Radøy, Meland, Askøy, 
Bergen, Os, Masfjorden, Lindas, Osterøy, Samnanger, Fusa, Modalen, 
Vaksdal, Kvam, Voss , Granvin and Ulvik.   401 335 
 
Helse Bergen HF. Region 
level.   Western Norway region.  996 870 
 
Helse Fonna HF Haugesund 
sjukehus  
The following municipalitites: Bokn, Haugesund, Karmøy, Tysvær, Utsira, 
Vindafjord, Etne, Sveio, Sauda and Suldal. 109 285 
 
Helse Fonna HF Odda 
sjukehus  Odda, Ullensvang, Eidfjord and Jondal  12 410 
 Helse Fonna HF Sauda  
Not included. Department Sauda is organized under Haugesund Hospital, 
surgical clinic. Offers daytreatment in surgery and urology.  
  
 
Helse Fonna HF Stord 
sjukehus  Stord, Bømlo, Fitjar, Tysnes and Kvinnherad.  47 215 
 Helse stavanger HF  
South of  Rogaland county: Søkndal, Lund, Eigersund, Bjerkreim, Hå, Time, 
Gjesdal, Klepp, Sandnes, Forsand, Stavanger, Sola, Randaberg Strandm 
Kvitsøy, Rennesøy, Hjelmeland and Finnøy.   320 140 
 Kysthospitalet i Hagevik  Not included due to high degree of specialization.    
 Lærdal sjukehus  
Indre Sogn: Aurland, Balestrand, Leikanger, Luster, Lærdal, Sogndal, Vik and 
Årdal.  19 230 
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 Nordfjord Sjukehus  
The following municipalitites: Stryn, Hornindal, Eid, Gloppen, Vågsøy, Selje 
and parts of Bremanger.  32 360 
 Voss Sjukehus  Kvam, Granvin, Ulvik, Voss, Vaksdal and Modalen.  28 720 
 
Haraldsplass Diakonale 
Sykehus  
Borough: Bergenhus, Åsane og Arna i Bergen.Municipalities: Lindås, Meland, 
Radøy, Austrheim, Fedje, Masfjorden, Samnanger and Osterøy.  123 391 
 
Haugesund 
sanitetsforeningsrevmatisme 
sykehus  
Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization. Provides 
services within skin diseases and rheumatism.   
 
Regional Health Authority Hospital    Catchment area muncipalities  Residence in the catchment area  
Southern and Eastern Norway     
 Sykehuset Asker og Bærum  Asker og Bærum  163 580 
 Sykehuset buskerud  Drammen, Nedre Eiker, Lier, Røyken and Hurum.  134 440 
 Sykehuset i Vestfold Larvik  Vestfold county  229 280 
 
Sykehuset i vestfold 
Sandefjord  Vestfold county 229 280 
 
Sykehuset i vestfold i 
Tønsberg  Vestfold county  229 280 
 
Sykehuset innlandet 
Elverum  
Engerdal, Trysil, Åmot, Ringsaker, Hamar, Løten, Elverum, Stange, Våler and 
Åsnes.  130 510 
 Sykehuset innlandet Hamar  
Engerdal, Trysil, Åmot, Ringsaker, Hamar, Løten, Elverum, Stange, Våler and 
Åsnes.  130 510 
 Sykehuset innlandet Gjøvik  
Vang, Vestre Slidre, Nord Aurdal, Sør- Aurdal, Øystre slidre, Etnedal, Nordre 
land, Gjøvik, Vestre toten, Østre Toten, Sørdre Land, Gran, Jevnaker and 
Lunner.  114 325 
 
Sykehus innlandet divisjon 
kongsvinger  
Nord Odalm Grue, Sør- Odal, Eidskog, kongsvinger and Nes in Akershus 
county.  60 355 
 
Sykehus innlandet Divisjon 
Lillehammer  
Lesja, Skjåk, Lom, Dovre, vågå, Nord- fon, Sel, Sør-fon, ringebu, Øyer, 
Gausdal and lillehammer.  70 070 
 
Sykehus innlandet divisjon 
Tynset  Os, Tolga, Tynset, folldal, Alvdal, Rendalen and Stor-Elvdal 17 870 
 
Sykehus innlandet 
Granheim Lungesykehuset  Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.    
 Sykehuset Telemark  Skien  Porsgrunn, Skien, Siljan, Bamble, Kragerø. Drangedal, Nissedal og Fyresdal.  119 930 
 
 
 
Sykehuset Telemark 
Kragerø sykehus  Porsgrunn, Skien, Siljan, Bamble, Kragerø. Drangedal, Nissedal and Fyresdal.  119 930 
 
Sykehuset Østfold avd. 
Askim  Østfold county.  267 915 
 
Sykehuset Østfold avd. 
Fredrikstad  Østfold county. 267 915 
 
Sykehuset Østfold avd. 
Halden  Østfold county. 267 915 
 
Sykehuset Østfold avd. 
Moss  Østfold county. 267 915 
 
Sykehuset Østfold avd. 
Sarpsborg  Østfold county. 267 915 
 
Sørlandet sykehus HF 
Arendal  Aust-Agder county 107 430 
 
Sørlandet sykehus HF 
Flekkefjord  Vest-Agder county  168 225 
 
Sørlandet sykehus HF 
kristiansand  Vest-Agder county  168 225 
 Diakonhjemmet sykehus  The following boroughs in Oslo:  Vestre Aker, Ullern and Frogner.  121 653 
 Martina Hansens hospital  Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.   --------- 
 
Revmatisme sykehuset 
Lillehammer   Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.   --------- 
 Betanien hospital Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.   --------- 
 
Spesialsykehuset for 
rehabilitering Stavern  Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.   --------- 
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Regional Health Authority Hospital    Catchment area muncipalities  Residence in the catchment area  
Southern and Eastern Norway     
 
Akershus 
universitetssykehus 
 Gjerdrum, Ullensaker, Nannestad, Eidsvoll, Nes, Hurdal, Aurskog-Høland, 
Enebakk, Fet, Lørenskog, Nittedal, Rælingen, Sørum og Skedsmo. Samt 
kommunene Rømskog og Enebakk. Bydeler i Oslo: Grorud and Stovner.   288 271 
 Blefjell sykehus kongsberg  Kongsberg, Nore og Uvdal, Sigdal, Rollag, Flesberg and Øvre Eiker.  50765 
 Blefjell sykehus Notodden  Bø, Hjartdal, Nome, Notodden, Kviteseid, Sauherad and Seljord.  35735 
 Blefjell sykehus Rjukan  Tinn, Tokke and Vinje.  12020 
 Epilepsisenteret - SSE Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.    
 Hjertesenteret i Oslo  Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.    
 
Lovisenberg Diakonale 
sykehus AS 
The following boroughs in Oslo: St. Hanhaugen, Grunerløkka, Sagene and 
Gamle Oslo.  150 594 
 
Oslo Universitetssykehus 
Aker  
The following boroughs in Oslo : Bjerke and Alna. Municipalities: Ski, 
Oppegård, Nesodden, Ås, Frogn and Vestby.  159 829 
 
Oslo Universitetssykehus 
Rikshospitalet. Local level.     The following boroughs in Oslo Frogner, Ullern og vestre Aker.  121 653 
 
Oslo Universitetssykehus 
Rikshospitalet. National 
responsibility.   National responsibility.   4 801 055 
 
Oslo universitetssykehus 
Ullevål fylkesfunksjon  
The following boroughs in Oslo : Sagene, Nordre Aker, Østensjø, Norstrand 
and Søndre Norstrand.  171 034 
 
Oslo Universitetssykehus 
Ullevål Regionfunksjon  SouthEastern region. 3 671 335 
 Ringerike sykehus  Ringerike, Hole, Flå, Gol, Hemsedal, Ål, Hol, Krødsherad and Modum.  66150 
 Stensby sykehus  Nannenstad, Hurdal, Eidsvoll, Ullensaker and Nes.  80505 
 Sunnaas sykehus  Not included in the study due to high degree of specialization.  .   
 
 
 
 
Appendix B:  
 
Hospital effective beds 2007 data:   
 
 
 Effective beds  
TOTAL NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE BEDS  13553 
Healthregion Sothern and Eastern Norway TOTAL  7382 
Aker universitetssykehus 343 
Akershus Universitetssykehus 496 
Bærum sykehus 254 
Diakonhjemmet sykehus  188 
Granheim lungesenter 40 
Kongsvinger sjukehus 124 
Lovisenberg diakonale sykehus 181 
Martina Hansens hospital  75 
Oppland sentralsykehus, avd. Gjøvik 201 
Oppland sentralsykehus, avd. Lillehammer 250 
Revmatismesykehuset AS  48 
Sentralsjukehuset i Hedmark 332 
Ski sykehus 0 
Stensby sykehus 68 
Sunnaas sykehus 148 
Sykehuset Innlandet Tynset 51 
Sykehuset Østfold 497 
Ullevål universitetssykehus 772 
Betanien Hospital  52 
Det Norske Radiumhospital 0 
Hjertesenteret i Oslo 0 
Kongsberg sykehus 103 
Kongsgård sykehus 0 
Kragerø sykehus 51 
Notodden sykehus 51 
Rikshospitalet - Radiumhospitalet 931 
Ringerike sykehus 144 
Rjukan sykehus 37 
Spesialsykehuset for epilepsi 0 
Spesialsykehuset for rehabilitering Stavern 110 
Sykehuset Buskerud 404 
Sykehuset i Vestfold 426 
Sykehuset Telemark 405 
Sørlandet sykehus Arendal 240 
Sørlandet sykehus Flekkefjord 65 
Sørlandet sykehus Kristiansand 188 
HEALTHREGION WESTERN NORWAY 2552 
Førde sentralsjukehus 188 
Haraldsplass Diakonale Sykehus AS  175 
Haugesund sanitetsforenings revmatisme sykehus 44 
Haugesund sjukehus 223 
Haukeland universitetssjukehus 975 
Lærdal sjukehus 54 
Nordfjord sjukehus 53 
Odda sjukehus 46 
Stavanger universitetssjukehus 634 
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Stord sjukehus 83 
Voss sjukehus 77 
HEALTHREGION CENTRAL NORWAY    1834 
Kristiansund sykehus 101 
Molde sjukehus 178 
Orkdal sjukehus 0 
St Olavs Hospital 878 
Sykehuset Levanger 203 
Sykehuset Namsos 107 
Volda sjukehus 67 
Ålesund sjukehus 300 
HEALTHREGION NORTHERN NORWAY   1539 
Hammerfest sykehus 102 
Harstad sykehus 103 
Helgelandssykehuset Mo i Rana 95 
Helgelandssykehuset Mosjøen 33 
Helgelandssykehuset Sandnessjøen 78 
Kirkenes sykehus 61 
Longearbyen sykehus 7 
Narvik sykehus 71 
Nordlandssykehuset Lofoten 52 
Nordlandssykehuset Sentrum 340 
Nordlandssykehuset Vesterålen 88 
Stokmarknes sykehus 0 
Universitetssykehuset i Nord-Norge 509 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B:  
Physician man labor years 2007 data: 
 
Physician Man-labor years  
TOTAL NUMBER OF PHYSICIAN MAN-LABOR YEARS:   8640 
HEALTHREGION SOUTHERN AND EASTERN NORWAY  4765 
Aker universitetssykehus 238 
Akershus Universitetssykehus 400 
Bærum sykehus 139 
Diakonhjemmet sykehus  107 
Granheim lungesenter 4 
Kongsvinger sjukehus 54 
Lovisenberg diakonale sykehus 76 
Martina Hansens hospital  33 
Oppland sentralsykehus, avd. Gjøvik 121 
Oppland sentralsykehus, avd. Lillehammer 152 
Revmatismesykehuset AS  14 
Sentralsjukehuset i Hedmark 230 
Ski sykehus 0 
Stensby sykehus 14 
Sunnaas sykehus 32 
Sykehuset Innlandet Tynset 24 
Sykehuset Østfold 340 
Ullevål universitetssykehus 785 
Betanien Hospital  18 
Det Norske Radiumhospital 0 
Hjertesenteret i Oslo 0 
Kongsberg sykehus 50 
Kongsgård sykehus 0 
Kragerø sykehus 6 
Notodden sykehus 23 
Rikshospitalet - Radiumhospitalet 754 
Ringerike sykehus 71 
Rjukan sykehus 9 
Spesialsykehuset for epilepsi 0 
Spesialsykehuset for rehabilitering Stavern 23 
Sykehuset Buskerud 235 
Sykehuset i Vestfold 278 
Sykehuset Telemark 189 
Sørlandet sykehus Arendal 118 
Sørlandet sykehus Flekkefjord 26 
Sørlandet sykehus Kristiansand 203 
HEALTHREGION WESTERN NORWAY TOTAL  1616 
Førde sentralsjukehus 151 
Haraldsplass Diakonale Sykehus AS  80 
Haugesund sanitetsforenings revmatisme sykehus  16 
Haugesund sjukehus 166 
Haukeland universitetssjukehus 708 
Lærdal sjukehus 0 
Nordfjord sjukehus 0 
Odda sjukehus 17 
Stavanger universitetssjukehus 411 
Stord sjukehus 39 
Voss sjukehus 30 
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HEALTHREGION CENTRAL NORWAY TOTAL   1157 
Kristiansund sykehus 59 
Molde sjukehus 108 
Orkdal sjukehus 0 
St Olavs Hospital 595 
Sykehuset Levanger 111 
Sykehuset Namsos 57 
Volda sjukehus 37 
Ålesund sjukehus 190 
HEALTHREGION NORTHERN NORWAY TOTAL  1008 
Hammerfest sykehus 57 
Harstad sykehus 71 
Helgelandssykehuset Mo i Rana 42 
Helgelandssykehuset Mosjøen 30 
Helgelandssykehuset Sandnessjøen 43 
Kirkenes sykehus 35 
Longearbyen sykehus 3 
Narvik sykehus 30 
Nordlandssykehuset Lofoten 21 
Nordlandssykehuset Sentrum 197 
Nordlandssykehuset Vesterålen 28 
Stokmarknes sykehus 0 
Universitetssykehuset i Nord-Norge 458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C  
The number of contracted private specialists measured in man-labor years by 
municipal.  
 
Mucipality  
Halden 
Man-labor 
years  
4.2 
Moss 9.2 
Sarpsborg 11.2 
Fredrikstad 20.8 
Spydeberg 0.2 
Askim 0.8 
Råde 1 
Rygge 0.2 
Våler 0.2 
Hobøl 3.7 
Vestby 2 
Ski 5.8 
Frogn 4.7 
Nesodden 5.4 
Oppegård 3.2 
Bærum 37.61 
Asker 15.38 
Rælingen 7.64 
Lørenskog 4.12 
Skedsmo 18.03 
Nittedal 1.04 
Ullensaker 4.3 
Nannestad 2.75 
Oslo 198.86 
Kongsvinger 2.28 
Hamar 13.7 
Ringsaker 3.2 
Løten 0.2 
Elverum 6.45 
Åmot 0.2 
Tynset 2 
Lillehammer 8.9 
Gjøvik 7.4 
Sør-Fron 0.4 
Østre Toten 0.5 
Vestre Toten 0.2 
Jevnaker 1 
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Lunner 1 
Gran 0.75 
Drammen 15.4 
Kongsberg 7.1 
Ringerike 2.5 
Nes 0.8 
Modum 1 
Øvre Eiker 0.8 
Horten 3.2 
Holmestrand 1.2 
Tønsberg 16.13 
Sandefjord 9.2 
Larvik 6.15 
Stokke 0.2 
Lardal 1 
Porsgrunn 6.6 
Skien 8.29 
Notodden 2.6 
Bamble 0.2 
Kragerø 0.2 
Tinn 0.2 
Hjartdal 1 
Seljord 0.8 
Tokke 0.4 
Risør 1.4 
Grimstad 0.62 
Arendal 1 
Tvedestrand 0.5 
Froland 8.8 
Kristiansand 22.97 
Mandal 1 
Farsund 1 
Flekkefjord 1 
Songdalen 2.3 
Søgne 0.2 
Eigersund 2.2 
Sandnes 8 
Stavanger 19.3 
Haugesund 12.7 
Time 1.2 
Sola 1.2 
Randaberg 2.6 
Strand 0.5 
Sauda 1 
Kvitsøy 0.2 
 
 
Bergen 46.36 
Etne 1 
Bømlo 0.2 
Stord 3.9 
Kvinnherad 1.2 
Odda 1 
Eidfjord 1 
Voss 3.2 
Kvam 0.5 
Os 14.45 
Fjell 7 
Flora 2 
Lærdal 0.84 
Fjaler 0.2 
Førde 1.2 
Naustdal 1 
Molde 2.2 
Ålesund 6.5 
Kristiansund 2.2 
Volda 0.2 
Rindal 1 
Trondheim 31.25 
Rissa 0.3 
Oppdal 1.4 
Røros 1.27 
Midtre Gauldal 0.2 
Steinkjer 1.4 
Namsos 3 
Stjørdal 1.2 
Levanger 7.5 
Bodø 13.45 
Narvik 2.85 
Sømna 0.75 
Alstahaug 0.2 
Vefsn 0.32 
Rana 1.575 
Fauske 0.8 
Vestvågøy 0.2 
Hadsel 0.2 
Øksnes 1.6 
Sortland 1 
Tromsø 14.2 
Kvæfjord 1 
Bjarkøy 0.2 
Alta 3.2 
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Porsanger Porsángu 
Porsanki 1 
Kárásjohka Karasjok 1.2 
 
 
Appendix D 
Evaluating the performance of the logistic model   
Log Likelihood Ratio Test     
Private Specialists Visit     
 Model 1*  Model 2 Model 3**  
Initial -2 log. Likelihood  6001.976   
-2 log Likelihood  5906.032 5791.038 5780.292 
Reduction in -2log likelihood  95.944 114.994 10.746 
Degrees of Freedom (The additional DF) 4 7 3 
Critical value at 5% level  9.4877 14.067 7.8147 
H0: The new model does not fit our data better  REJECT  REJECT  REJECT 
    
McFaddens statistic  0.015985402 0.035144759 0.036935169 
    
    
    
 Model 1*  Model 2 Model 4**  
Initial -2 log. Likelihood  6088.341   
-2 log Likelihood  5992.435 5871.222 5819.53 
Reduction in -2 log likelihood  95.906 121.213 51.692 
Degrees of Freedom (The additional DF) 4 7 2 
Critical value at 5% level  9.4877 14.067 5.9915 
H0: The new model does not fit our data better  REJECT  REJECT  REJECT  
    
McFaddens statistic  0.015752403 0.035661439 0.044151765 
*Model 1 are being compared with a model consisting of a constant term only.   
**Model 3 and 4 are both being compared agaist model 2, since the test requires nested models.   
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Log Likelihood Ratio Test     
Hospital Inpatient Stay     
 Model 1*  Model 2 Model 3**  
Initial -2 log. Likelihood  4003.096   
-2 log Likelihood  3853.567 3815.138 3809.56 
Reduction in -2 log likelihood  149.529 38.429 5.578 
Degrees of Freedom (The additional DF) 4 7 3 
Critical value at 5% level  9.4877 14.067 7.8147 
H0: The new model does not fit our data better  REJECT  REJECT  FAIL TO REJECT  
    
McFaddens statistic  0.037353339 0.046953158 0.04834658 
    
 Model 1*  Model 2 Model 4**  
Initial -2 log. Likelihood  4054.358   
-2 log Likelihood  3900.604 3862.103 3856.544 
Reduction in -2 log likelihood  153.754 38.502 5.559 
Degrees of Freedom (The additional DF) 4 7 2 
Critical value at 5% level  9.4877 14.067 5.9915 
H0: The new model does not fit our data better  REJECT  REJECT  FAIL TO REJECT  
    
Macfaddens statistic 0.037923143 0.047419591 0.048790709 
*Model 1 are being compared with a model consisting of a constant term only.   
**Model 3 and 4 are both being compared agaist model 2, since the test requires nested models.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hospital Outpatient Visit     
 Model 1*  Model 2 Model 3**  
Initial -2 log. Likelihood  7019.982   
-2 log Likelihood  6583.913 6545.237 6540.344 
Reduction in -2 log likelihood  43.,069 38.676 4.893 
Degrees of Freedom (The additional DF) 4 7 3 
Critical value at 5% level  9.4877 14.067 7.8147 
H0: The new model does not fit our data better  REJECT  REJECT  FAIL TO REJECT  
    
McFaddens statistic  0.06211825 0.067627666 0.068324677 
    
 Model 1*  Model 2 Model 4**  
Initial -2 log. Likelihood  7115.9   
-2 log Likelihood  6670.559 6628 6613.726 
Reduction in -2 log likelihood  445.341 38.502 14.274 
Degrees of Freedom (The additional DF) 4 7 2 
Critical value at 5% level  9.4877 14.067 5.9915 
H0: The new model does not fit our data better  REJECT  REJECT  REJECT  
    
Macfaddens statistic 0.062583932 0.067994632 0.070000562 
*Model 1 are being compared with a model consisting of a constant term only.   
**Model 3 and 4 are both being compared agaist model 2, since the test requires nested models.   

 
 
 
